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Policy Summary
Displaced workers are usually defined as persons on layoff with a stable
employment history who have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their
old employer or even in their old industry. The need to seek reemployment
in a new occupation or industry sometimes requires that displaced workers
acquire the vocational skills needed in expanding industries, and may also re
quire the enhancement of long-forgotten job search skills. Retraining is broadly
defined to include both.
As stated by the author, the principal roles for publicly sponsored retrain
ing programs are twofold: (1) to reduce the private and social costs associated
with unnecessary delays hi the reemployment process, and (2) to assist in the
replacement of specific human capital lost when a permanent layoff takes place.
This study examines nine different demonstration projects and operating pro
grams to determine how well public retraining programs for displaced workers
fulfill these roles.
The book attempts to answer four policy questions regarding the effectiveness
of retraining programs in speeding up the reemployment of workers displaced
from jobs by permanent layoffs or plant closures:
Do some types of training work better than others?
Do some groups of workers benefit more from training than others?
To the extent that training improves reemployment prospects, does it
work by increasing post-training wage rates or by reducing the duration
of unemployment?
Referring specifically to vocational training, how do we know what to
train workers to do?
One unambiguous finding of the study is that job search assistance strongly
affects a variety of labor market outcomes, including earnings, placement and
employment rates, and level of UI benefits. Given its cost effectiveness, the
evidence analyzed in this study suggests that job search assistance should be
the core of any adjustment assistance services offered displaced workers. With
respect to other services, however, the evidence is not as conclusive. There
is no clear evidence that either classroom or on-the-job training has a signifi
cant net impact on employment or earnings. The author proposes an agenda
for future research, including the collection of additional evidence on the deter
minants of success or failure of training programs.

Contents
1 INTRODUCTION........................................
Questions to be Answered ................................
Organization of the Study .................................

1
2
5

2 CETA EVALUATIONS ...................................
Methodological Approaches ...............................
Evaluation Results .......................................
Notes..................................................

7
8
11
15

3 EVIDENCE FROM U.S. DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS .....
The Downriver Program ..................................
The Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project................
The Buffalo Dislocated Worker Program ..................
Buffalo Program Evaluation Results.......................

17
19
25
25
27

The Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration Project .........

31

The New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Project......
Program Design and Implementation ......................
Evaluation Results .....................................
Summary...............................................
Notes..................................................

36
37
40
47
50

4 STATE RETRAINING PROGRAMS ........................
California's ETP ........................................
Major Program Features ................................
Evaluation Evidence....................................
Criticisms of ETP .....................................
Minnesota's MEED Program ..............................
Major Program Features ................................
Contrasts with ETP ....................................
The Dayton Wage-Subsidy Experiment ....................
Assessing MEED's Impact ..............................
Summary...............................................
Notes..................................................

51
53
53
55
58
60
60
62
64
66
67
69

5 CANADIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS ......................
The Canadian Jobs Strategy ...............................
Job Development ......................................
Skill Investment .......................................
Community Futures ....................................

71
72
72
74
75

vii

The NITP Evaluation ....................................
The CMITP Evaluation...................................
The Net Impact Analysis ................................
Data on Participating Employers .........................
The YTO Evaluation ...................................
Summary...............................................
Notes..................................................

76
81
81
83
87
88
90

6 AUSTRALIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS ....................
Basic Elements of the Programs............................
The SAA Program .....................................
The LATA Program ...................................
Heavy Engineering Labour Adjustment Assistance...........
The 1986 LATA Evaluation Study .........................
Summary...............................................

91
91
91
94
95
96
98

7 CONCLUSION .......................................... 101
Major Policy Questions ................................... 102
Agenda for Future Research............................... 108
References ................................................. Ill
Index ..................................................... 115

Tables
2.1 Taxonomy of Methodological Approaches to Estimating
Net Program Impacts...................................
2.2 Estimated CETA Net Impacts on Earnings of Adult
Workers, by Sex and Race ..............................
3.1 Characteristics of Major Displaced Worker Demonstrations ....
3.2 Net Impact Estimates for Major Displaced Worker
Demonstrations........................................
3.3 Estimated Program Impacts for the Buffalo Dislocated
Worker Project, by Principal Program Treatment ...........
3.4 Estimated Program Impact on Quarterly Earnings for the
Texas WAD Projects, by Sex ............................
3.5 Net Impact Estimates for Men in the Houston WAD
Project, by Program Treatment ..........................
vm

9
12
18
21
29
34
35

3.6 Estimated Program Impacts on UI Receipt for the New Jersey
UI Reemployment Demonstration, by Program Treatment ....
3.7 Estimated Program Impacts on Employment, Earnings, and
Post-UI Wages for the New Jersey UI Reemployment
Demonstration, by Program Treatment ....................
4.1 Major Features of California's ETP and Minnesota's MEED
Programs and the Dayton Experiment .....................
4.2 Summary Statistics for the ETP Program, June 30, 1988 ......
4.3 Estimated Net Impact of the ETP Program
on Annual Earnings ....................................
4.4 Job Placement Rates in the Dayton Targeted Wage-Subsidy
Experiment ...........................................

42
45
52
55
56
65

5.1 Component Programs of the Canadian Jobs Strategy ..........
5.2 Net Impact Estimates for the NITP, Skill Training and
BTSD Programs .......................................
5.3 Comparison of Pre- and Post-Program Weekly Wages
for the CMITP ........................................
5.4 Effect of the CMITP on Training Opportunities, by Size
of Training Employer ..................................
5.5 Estimated Impacts of Establishment Size and CMITP
Assistance on Length of Company Training Programs........

73

6.1 Australian Programs to Assist Displaced Workers ............
6.2 Net Impact Estimates of LATA Training on the
Probability of Reemployment ............................

92

IX

79
82
85
86

98

Introduction

For more than 25 years the federal government and individual
state governments have provided retraining programs to ease the la
bor market adjustments required of workers directly or indirectly dis
placed from their jobs by a mass layoff or plant closure. Displaced
workers are usually defined as persons on layoff who possess a sta
ble employment history. In addition to their work experience, the
main distinction between displaced and other laid-off workers is that
the displaced have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their
old employer or even in their old industry. Displaced workers are
therefore said to be "permanently" laid off.
The report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic
Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (1986: 13-16) presents a useful
capsule description of the characteristics of displaced workers.
Drawing on the information available for individual displaced work
ers in the 1984 and 1986 Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS), the re
port points out that almost 50 percent of displaced workers had lost
jobs in manufacturing, mostly in durable goods manufacturing indus
tries such as primary metals and transportation equipment. Only 20
percent of all employed workers and about 23 percent of all unem
ployed workers, in contrast, are associated with manufacturing. In
addition, the displaced were disproportionately blue-collar workers
concentrated in the Midwest and other sections of the country with a
heavy manufacturing base.
As compared to the workforce as a whole, the Task Force report
also notes that displaced workers endure significantly longer spells of
unemployment following layoff. In particular, there is a much smaller
fraction of the displaced in the 1- to 4-week unemployment dura
tion category and a much larger fraction in the 15- to 26-week cate
gory. Because layoffs tend to be permanent rather than temporary,
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moreover, occupational mobility is higher for displaced workers than
for other workers. About one-half of those displaced workers reemployed as of January 1984 had made a major occupational change.
Using 1984 DWS data, Flaim and Sehgal (1985) also point out that
about 30 percent of displaced workers reemployed in full-time wage
and salary jobs suffered an earnings loss of 20 percent or more and
that nearly one-quarter of reemployed displaced workers failed to
regain the group health insurance coverage they enjoyed on their
lost job. Not to be overlooked, finally, are the severe emotional
adjustments required of workers abruptly displaced from jobs they
perceived as "good jobs" and expected to retain into the foresee
able future.
The need to seek reemployment in a new occupation or industry
may require that displaced workers tool up in the vocational skills
required to qualify for jobs in expanding industries. A stable work
history suggests, moreover, that the job search skills of many dis
placed workers are likely to have grown rusty from disuse because of
a lengthy attachment to the pre-layoff employer. For the second of
these reasons, retraining is defined broadly to include the enhance
ment of job search skills in addition to the traditional focus on vo
cational training. The principal roles for publicly sponsored
retraining programs are twofold: (1) to reduce the private and social
costs associated with unnecessary delays in the reemployment pro
cess, and (2) to assist in the replacement of specific human capital
lost when a permanent layoff unexpectedly takes place.

Questions to be Answered
The purpose of this monograph is to answer the following research
questions involving government training assistance to displaced
workers:
1. Do some types of training work better than others?
2. Do some groups of workers benefit more from training than
others?
3. To the extent that training improves reemployment prospects,
does it work by increasing post-training wage rates or by reducing
the duration of unemployment?
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4. Referring specifically to vocational training, how do we know
what to train workers to do?
Question 1 raises the possibility that the major types of training
classroom training (CT), on-the-job training (OJT), job search assis
tance (ISA), and remedial education may differ in the benefits they
offer displaced workers, as well as in their costs. The premise of CT
is that the specific skills of displaced workers have been made
largely obsolete, but that skills of potential interest to a number of
employers can be developed through intensive, formal training in a
classroom setting. OJT, on the other hand, is appropriate in the ac
quisition of firm-specific skills that can most efficiently be learned
on the job. The objective of ISA is basically to assist job-ready
workers to develop effective job-seeking skills. Finally, remedial ed
ucation programs are designed to assist the perhaps 20 percent of
displaced workers who have a deficiency in reading or problem solv
ing skills severe enough to retard reemployment or even the acquisi
tion of new job skills.
Question 2 is posed in recognition of the fact that not all displaced
workers may benefit equally from retraining services and, moreover,
that not all of these workers are equally in need of adjustment assis
tance. The analysis of 1984 DWS data by Podgursky and Swaim
(1987a) shows that the distribution of completed spells of joblessness
is highly skewed to the right. While nearly half of the respondents in
their sample found jobs within 14 weeks of displacement, a substan
tial minority faced a high risk of being jobless for a year or more. It
is this minority to whom adjustment assistance efforts should be tar
geted. Podgursky and Swaim loosely identify these individuals to in
clude workers displaced from blue-collar occupations, workers with
below-average levels of education, racial minorities and women, and
residents of communities with above-average unemployment rates. In
a parallel paper also using DWS data, Podgursky and Swaim (1987b)
report that a sizable minority of displaced workers mostly workers
with substantial specific human capital investments experienced
large and enduring earnings losses upon reemployment.
The distinction made in Question 3 is intended to separate the
effect of vocational training on labor productivity as measured by a
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higher post-training hourly wage from its effect in speeding up reemployment by providing a credential that moves workers up in the
queue for vacant jobs. Question 4, finally, focuses attention on the
issue of how to identify growth occupations and develop appropriate
curricula so that successful program graduates have a reasonable
chance of being hired and retained in training-related jobs.
The policy relevance of these research questions is brought out
clearly in the provisions of the Economic Dislocation and Worker
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) passed by Congress and signed
into law by President Reagan in August 1988. This act amended the
existing Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JJPA), and
sharply increased the level of federal funds to be used by the states
in establishing programs to meet the adjustment assistance needs of
displaced workers. Program services, many of which were recom
mended by the Secretary of Labor's Task Force report (1986), are
described in the enabling legislation under the headings of "basic
readjustment services" and "retraining services." Basic readjust
ment services are defined to include such ISA services as outreach
and orientation, job and career counseling, testing and assessment,
provision of labor market information, job clubs, job development,
and supportive services such as child care and commuting assis
tance. In addition to CT and OJT programs and remedial education,
retraining services include relocation allowances, literacy and English
programs for non-English speakers, and entrepreneurial training. The
act also specifies that funds are not to be spent on public service
employment (PSE) programs, but that needs-related payments may
be provided to an eligible displaced worker who does not qualify or
has ceased to qualify for unemployment compensation in order that
he or she may participate in training or education programs.
EDWAA thus allows a great deal of latitude in the types of dis
placed worker programs eligible for federal funding. It is my inten
tion that the answers to the four research questions posed in this
chapter will be of assistance to state and federal government officials
charged with the responsibilities of designing, implementing, oper
ating, and monitoring the displaced worker programs called for by
the new legislation.
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Organization of the Study
The monograph begins in chapter 2 with an overview of the exist
ing evaluations of federally funded Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) programs. CETA predated JTPA and pro
vided funding for training and PSE programs during the 1973-82
period. Although CETA programs were not limited to training assis
tance or to serving displaced workers, the CETA evaluations are a
good starting point for two reasons. First, they provide baseline
quantitative estimates to which the impacts of later programs and
demonstration projects can be compared. Second and more impor
tant, a discussion of the CETA evaluations represents an opportunity
to introduce some of the main methodological issues involved in pro
gram evaluation.
Chapter 3 is in many respects the heart of the monograph. Here
the large volume of quantitative evidence generated by four major
demonstration projects funded by the federal government during the
1980s is examined in detail. These projects are the Downriver pro
gram, the Buffalo program of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration
Project, the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration (WAD), and
the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reemployment Dem
onstration project.
Chapter 4 follows with an analysis of the largely qualitative evi
dence on the design and implementation of statewide continuing pro
grams in California and Minnesota. California's Employment
Training Panel (ETP) provides classroom training to displaced work
ers and employed workers at risk of displacement, while the Minne
sota Employment and Economic Development (MEED) program is
targeted wage-subsidy initiative. Considered also in connection with
the Minnesota program are results from the federally funded Dayton
targeted wage-subsidy experiment. This chapter is particularly help
ful in providing insight into Question 4.
In chapters 5 and 6, the discussion moves from domestic retrain
ing programs to a consideration of programs provided displaced
workers by other nations. Examined in chapter 5 are the training
programs presently in place in Canada and the available quanti
tative evaluations of the National Institutional Training Program
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(NITP) and the Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program
(CMITP). Similarly, chapter 6 discusses Australia's federally funded
displaced worker programs and presents the main results of an eval
uation of the Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements (LATA)
program.
Chapter 7 concludes the monograph with answers to the four pol
icy questions and an agenda for future research.

2
CETA Evaluations

The federal government's first comprehensive attempt to provide
adjustment assistance to displaced workers was the Manpower Devel
opment and Training Act (MDTA). Passed in 1962, MDTA repre
sented the response of Congress to a rising national unemployment
rate coupled with growing concern over the effects of technological
change on the employment options of mid-career adult workers. 1
The primary objective of the program was to provide retraining for
workers whose skills had been made obsolete by new technology. By
the mid-1960s, however, an improved labor market and lessened con
cern over automation led to a shift in interest and funding away from
the reemployment problems of displaced workers and toward the employability of disadvantaged young people and welfare recipients.
The next major federal training initiative was the passage in 1973
of CETA, which consolidated nine earlier programs including
MDTA. Program services funded under CETA were directed toward
workers unemployed for both structural and cyclical reasons, and
program participants typically received income-maintenance sti
pends. The range of services provided during CETA's 10-year exist
ence included classroom training, on-the-job training in the private
sector, PSE, and work experience (subsidized public-sector jobs em
phasizing work habits and basic skill development designed for indi
viduals with essentially no prior labor market experience). A small
number of participants also received job placement services (called
"direct referrals"). As unemployment rose during the 1970s, CETA
expenditures shifted away from training programs toward the provi
sion of PSE job slots. PSE programs typically provided little or no
training. By 1981, charges of careless management and enrollment
of ineligible applicants led to the elimination of CETA funding for
PSE jobs, and CETA itself was not renewed at its scheduled 1982
expiration data. 2
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Methodological Approaches
A number of evaluation studies of MDTA programs appeared in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, but these early attempts at evaluation
were generally hampered by the lack of a comparison or control
group, as well as the absence of good information on earnings. 3 The
fundamental problem in program evaluation is developing a reliable
methodology for assessing what would have happened to participants
had they not enrolled in the program. Without a comparison or con
trol group, analysts interested in obtaining net impact estimates are
basically limited to using participants as their own control group by
comparing post-program labor market outcomes like earnings with
the level of participants' own pre-program earnings. Referring to the
taxonomy in table 2.1, this is the first of the four methodological
approaches used in the evaluation reports described in this study.
The major difficulty with the pre-program/post-program approach is
that the pre-program dip in earnings that caused workers to seek to
enroll in the program in the first place may be merely a temporary
interruption in their permanent time path of earnings. If the pre
program dip is caused by some transitory labor market phenomenon,
the program would receive "credit" for a rebound in earnings that
would have happened anyway. In addition, all other events that are
time conditional (e.g., an upturn in the economy) are assumed con
stant an assumption which is patently false.
The second methodological approach described in table 2.1 in
volves constructing a comparison group from data on programeligible workers who did not, for whatever reason, participate in the
program. This methodology has the advantage of making it unneces
sary to control statistically for differences between members of the
treatment and comparison groups since they are drawn from the
same population. It has the important disadvantage, however, of
bringing to the forefront the problem of "selection bias." This prob
lem arises because program participants both choose to enroll and
are selected by program operators. Thus, personal characteristics
such as ability and motivation that are unobservable to the analyst
are likely to lead to a positive correlation between program partici
pation and the error term in the earnings equation. In other words, a
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Table 2.1
Taxonomy of Methodological Approaches to Estimating
______________Net Program Impacts______________
Programs and
Methodological
demonstrations
approach
_____
Discussion
___ examined
Pre-program/
post-program
comparison

Earnings of participants are likely to re
cover from their "pre-program dip" even
in the absence of the program. Hence, the
effect of the program will be overstated.

California's ETP and
Canada's CMITP

Use of a selfselected comparison
group composed of
nonparticipants from
the program-eligible
population

Has the advantage that participants and
comparison group members are drawn from
the same population, but the disadvantage
of the "selection bias" that results if par
ticipants would have had different earnings
than nonparticipants, even in the absence
of the program.

Canada's NITP and
Australia's LATA

Use of an external
comparison group

Since participants and nonparticipants are
not drawn from the same population, it is
necessary to control statistically for differ
ences between participants and comparison
group members. This is accomplished by
(1) specifying an earnings function that
would prevail for both groups in the ab
sence of the program (which may also in
clude observable determinants of the
participation decision) and/or (2) selecting
a "matched" subsample that has approxi
mately the same characteristics on average
as the participant sample.

CETA, Down
river, and Buffalo
nontarget-plant
sample

Use of a randomly
selected control
group from the
program-eligible
population

By randomly assigning participants and
nonparticipants, selection bias is avoided
by directly breaking the link between par
ticipation and unobservable determinants
of earnings.

Buffalo target-plant
sample, Texas' WAD,
the New Jersey UI
demonstration, and
the Dayton wagesubsidy experiment

selection bias arises because the earnings of program graduates
would differ from the earnings of nonparticipants, even in the ab
sence of the program.
Although a few of the programs examined in this study have been
evaluated using either the pre-program/post-program approach or a
self-selected nonparticipant comparison group, most of the evalua
tions considered provide net impact estimates based on either an ex-
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ternally selected comparison group or a randomly selected control
group drawn from the program-eligible population. An important
feature of CETA was that, for the first time, the U.S. Department of
Labor (USDOL) funded the development of a data base specifically
designed for program evaluation. Termed the Continuous Longitudi
nal Manpower Survey (CLMS), this data base includes three compo
nents: (1) data for random samples of CETA enrollees collected
quarterly beginning in 1975, (2) data for comparison groups drawn
from March Current Population Survey (CPS) files, and (3) Social
Security earnings records for each CETA enrollee and each member
of the CPS comparison groups. Thus, the methodological approach
to program evaluation permitted by CLMS data involves the use of
an externally selected comparison group in this case, a sample
drawn from the CPS. As noted in table 2.1, a general problem with
this third methodology is that differences between the treatment and
comparison groups will exist because they are not drawn from the
same population. The two groups are therefore not statistically
equivalent. In the particular case of CLMS data, CETA eligibility
was generally restricted to individuals in low-income families, with
the result that CETA enrollees differ from members of the nationally
representative CPS sample in terms of such characteristics as previ
ous work experience and education.
The important advantage of the fourth methodological approach
that involving random assignment of program-eligible workers to
treatment and control groups is that the link is broken between pro
gram participation and unobservable determinants of earnings. This
allows unbiased net program effects to be obtained. Most analysts
therefore conclude that randomized experiments are necessary to
produce reliable estimates of program impacts (see, for example,
Fraker and Maynard 1987; and LaLond 1986). In defending the value
of nonexperimental methods of program evaluation, however, Heckman, Hotz, and Dabos (1987: 421-24) emphasize the costs and prac
tical difficulties of conducting social experiments and, in their view,
the limited value of experimental data. They note, in particular, that
participation in a training program entails a multistage process of
application, selection, continuation in the program until completion,
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and job placement. An experimental assessment of the effect of
training conditional on completing each stage of the process requires
random assignment of each stage something that is rarely done in
social experiments. Hence, a case can be made that nonexperimental
methods have a role to play in realistic plans of program evaluation.

Evaluation Results
Barnow (1987) provides a useful survey of 11 major CETA evalu
ations. Table 2.2 summarizes the net impact estimates presented in
the five studies he surveyed that use data for adult workers and that
provide some breakdown in the results by sex, race, and type of pro
gram service. Also shown are results from a recent CETA evaluation
by Finifter (1987). The estimates measure the impact of CETA on
the first year of post-program earnings for participants enrolled in
1975 and/or 1976 net of the earnings of the CPS comparison group.
Since PSE and work experience offered enrollees relatively little
training, the table focuses on training opportunities supplied through
classroom and on-the-job training.
Three conclusions appear to be warranted. First, most of the esti
mates shown in the table for women are larger than those for men,
with the male estimates often being zero or even negative. Bloom
and McLaughlin (1982) suggest in this connection that regardless of
program activity, the main effect of CETA training was to facilitate
labor market entry. Thus, persons who were out of the labor market,
primarily women, enjoyed a larger program impact than those with
extensive but unsuccessful labor market experience, primarily men.
If Bloom and McLaughlin's suggestion is correct, however, the net
impact estimates for women will be upwardly biased to the extent
that female labor force entrants are not a random sample of all
women.
The second conclusion is that on-the-job training is typically more
effective than classroom training, particularly for minority enrollees.
The larger impact for OJT than CT is to be expected since the most
job-ready of enrollees are those likely to be selected by employers
for OJT slots. Relative to classroom training, OJT may also have a
larger impact on earnings in the short run than in the long run be-
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Table 2.2
Estimated CETA Net Impacts on Earnings of Adult Workers,
by Sex and Race
Women
Men
Minority
White
Minority
White
Study
Westat (1981)
CT
OJT
Overall
Bassi (1983)
CT
OJT
Overall
Bloom & McLaughlin
(1982)
CT
OJT
Overall

$ 200
1,150
200

$550
550
500

$ 500
1,200
600

582-773
2,053-2,057
117-211

63-205
80-382
740-778

426-633
1,368-1,549
426-671

300
1,500

1,300
1,200

1,100
800

$400
750
200

300
-200
200

Dickinson, Johnson & West (1986)
-343
CT
-363
OJT
-690
Overall

800-1,300
0
35
13

Geraci (1984)
CT
OJT
Overall

372
612

1,201
882

Finifter (1987)
CT
OJT
Overall

-9
686

507
723

Sources. Barnow (1987: table 3) for the Westat through Geraci studies, and Finifter (1987:
table 1).
Note: "Overall" refers to the combined impact of CT, OJT, PSE, work experience, and
indicates that an estimate is not reported.
multiple activities

cause job retention is usually assured for a short time after the sub
sidy period ends.
Finally, the range of CETA net impact estimates shown in table
2.2 is uncomfortably wide. At first glance it may seem odd that stud
ies using the same data set to estimate the same treatment effect
should arrive at such different estimates. The basic problem is that
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the absence of a classical experiment in which sample members are
randomly assigned to either the treatment group or the control group
requires CLMS users to make a number of critical decisions. Most of
these decisions involve (1) controlling for differences between mem
bers of the treatment and comparison groups, and (2) coping with
the selection bias problem. With respect to the first issue, analysts of
CLMS data have proceeded by specifying an earnings function that
would prevail for both groups in the absence of the program and/or
selecting a subsample of CPS respondents that matches CETA par
ticipants on a number of key variables determining earnings. The
purpose of drawing a matched comparison sample is to reduce pre
program differences between the CETA and CPS samples so that the
regression estimates will be less sensitive to the incorrect specifica
tion of the post-program earnings function. Weighting the observa
tions in the earnings regression is also used to make mean values of
the explanatory variables more alike in the treatment and comparison
groups.
The seriousness of the selection bias problem appears to be re
duced in CETA evaluations because the comparison group is drawn
from CPS data rather than from the self-selected population of
program-eligible nonparticipants. Nevertheless, program participa
tion is not a random event; participants must have passed through a
multistage screening process. Analysts of CLMS data have therefore
pursued a number of different approaches in attempting to deal with
the selection bias problem. In increasing order of complexity, these
include (1) specifying additional explanatory variables in the postprogram earnings equation to capture factors believed to be impor
tant in the selection process, (2) making specific assumptions about
unobservable variables invariant over time which potentially affect
both program selection and earnings in an attempt (typically using a
first-difference estimator) to eliminate correlation in the earnings
equation between the error term and the training variable, and (3)
explicitly modeling the selection process in a separate participation
equation and then jointly estimating the participation and earnings
equations. The results reported by different analysts may clearly
vary in important respects depending on the specification of the
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earnings function, the matching technique used, the attempt, if any,
to model the selection procedure, the assumptions made about unobservable variables, and the decision reached on whether and how to
weight CPS observations.
The multiplicity of decisions required of CLMS users makes it dif
ficult to assess the extent to which differences in methodological ap
proach account for the wide range of net impact estimates displayed
in table 2.2. Fortunately, Dickinson, Johnson, and West (1986) per
form the useful service of trying to reconcile their very low and
even, for men, negative impact estimates with the sizable positive
estimates reported for both men and women in the influential study
by Westat (1981). Their analysis suggests that Westat's results are
quite sensitive to (1) the omission of pre-enrollment earnings in the
post-program earnings regressions and (2) the decision to include in
the comparison sample persons without strong labor market ties.
When pre-enrollment earnings are controlled for and persons without
strong labor market ties are excluded from the comparison sample,
Dickinson, Johnson, and West report that Westat's methodology
would result in substantially lower net impact estimates of -$529 for
adult men and $299 for adult women. This estimate for men is in
roughly the same ballpark as the overall estimate of -$690 shown in
table 2.2 for the authors' own study. With respect to female CETA
participants, it is interesting to note that Dickinson, Johnson, and
West conclude that their overall impact estimate reported in the table
of just $13 per year is likely to be on the conservative side, and that
an estimate on the order of $200 to $300 (i.e., an estimate close to
the revised Westat estimate of $299) is more reasonable.
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NOTES
1. Also passed in 1962, the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was created to pro
vide income support and retraining to workers who lost jobs in industries adversely affected by
foreign imports. The TAA program is discussed at greater length in chapter 6 in connection
with the Australian Structural Adjustment Assistance (SAA) program.
2. Levitan and Gallo (1988) provide an interesting discussion of the demise of CETA and
its replacement by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), along with a spirited defense
of CETA.
3. An important exception is Ashenfelter's (1978) study of the impact of MDTA-funded CT
programs using as a comparison group a sample drawn from the Continuous Work History
Sample maintained by the Social Security Administration. Ashenfelter reports for males that
the net impact of training on annual earnings is between $150 and $500 in the year immedi
ately following training, declining to about half these amounts after five years. For females,
the net impact estimates are between $300 and $600, with no evidence of a decline in suc
ceeding years.

3
Evidence From U.S.
Demonstration Projects

The CETA program expired in 1982 with the national economy
mired in the trough of the deepest recession since the 1930s. Rather
than renewing the CETA program with its politically unpopular em
phasis on PSE, extended negotiations between President Reagan and
Congress resulted in a broad new program the Job Training Part
nership Act (JTPA) to train and place workers in private-sector
jobs. Title III of JTPA is specifically directed at assisting displaced
workers. l Relative to CETA, the new legislation gives increased re
sponsibility to state governments for planning and implementing dis
placed worker programs. Moreover, it defines a more active role for
the business community in program development through the estab
lishment of Private Industry Councils (PICs). Finally, JTPA differs
from CETA in its concentration of resources on training and JSA
services rather than PSE and income maintenance and in its require
ment that numerical performance standards be used in assessing lo
cal program success.
Because many displaced workers failed to satisfy the income test
required for program eligibility, the experience gained from CETA
programs was of limited usefulness in shaping the direction of new
Title III JTPA programs. Rising unemployment and an increasing
number of plant closures led the USDOL to begin funding in 1980 a
series of demonstration projects intended to test the effectiveness of
alternative reemployment services in placing displaced workers in
private-sector jobs. This chapter examines the results of four major
demonstration projects starting, in chronological order, with the
Downriver displaced worker program. Table 3.1 presents an over
view of the four demonstrations indicating the time periods during
which the programs were in operation, the groups of displaced work17
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Table 3.1
Characteristics of Major Displaced Worker Demonstrations
DemonstraTime
Targeted
Evaluation
workers
Sample size
tion project
period
method
Downriver:
Phase I

Phase II
Buffalo:
Target
plant

July 1980Sept. 1981

Nov. 1981Sept. 1983
Oct. 1982Sept. 1983

Nontarget
plant

Texas WAD:
Houston

1983-85

El Paso

New Jersey UI
project

Experienced male
workers laid off
from particular
auto and auto
parts plants

July 1986fall 1987

388 treatment;
384 comparison

Comparison
group drawn ran
domly from other
auto plants

594 treatment;
341 comparison
Experienced male
workers laid off
from 6 steel and
auto plants

281 treatment;
516 comparison

Random assign
ment of program
slots to treatment
and control
groups

Experienced male
workers laid off
from 3 other steel
and auto plants or
from over 300
other establish
ments

251 treatment;
470 comparison

Self-selected
treatment and
comparison
groups

Mostly male pro
fessional workers
laid off from
petrochemical
plants eligible for
Title III JTPA
programs

470 treatment;
164 control

Random assign
ment of eligible
workers to treat
ment and control
groups

Mostly female
Hispanic workers
laid off from
light manufactur
ing plants eligible
for Title III JTPA
programs

362 treatment;
312 control

Male and female
UI claimants with
at least 3 years of
tenure

8,675 treatment;
2,385 control

Random assign
ment of eligible
workers to treat
ment and control
groups
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ers to which services were targeted, sample sizes, and differences in
evaluation methodologies.
The Downriver Program
The Downriver displaced worker program was conceived by the
Downriver Community Conference a consortium representing six
teen communities in the southwestern suburbs of Detroit in re
sponse to the closing of a BASF auto parts plant in April 1980.
Downriver staff members moved quickly following the plant closing
announcement to develop a service delivery plan to assist in the reemployment of about 700 laid-off BASF workers. During the sum
mer of 1980, the USDOL became interested in the Downriver
program as a possible model for the development of a national dis
placed worker program. An initial federal grant of $1.2 million al
lowed the program to expand its target population to include 1,100
workers permanently laid off from a nearby DANA auto parts plant.
Comparison plants selected for this first phase of the program were a
Lear-Siegler Corporation plant and the Chrysler Huber Avenue
Foundry, both of which were closed permanently during the summer
of 1980. Phase I of the program continued from July 1980 through
September 1981.
Based on the first year's performance, an additional federal grant
of $3.825 million was awarded to extend Downriver program ser
vices to about 2,000 workers laid off from the Ford Motor Com
pany's Michigan Casting Company (MCC) plant. This second phase
of the program was in operation from November 1981 to September
1983. Laid off workers from a Chrysler assembly plant and the
Chrysler Foundry served as the comparison group in Phase II.
Across both phases, program-eligible workers were experienced
male production workers above the age of 25 who earned high wages
averaging about $10.00 per hour on their pre-displacement jobs.
BASF and DANA workers averaged nearly 15 years of tenure on
their pre-displacement jobs, while average tenure for Ford MCC
workers was about seven years. Most program-eligible workers were
married with family responsibilities, and about 31 percent were
black. It should be emphasized that workers were not randomly
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assigned to the treatment and comparison groups. Rather, treatment
and comparison group members were randomly selected, respec
tively, from the treatment and comparison plants.
Recruitment for the Downriver program was plant-based, with the
cooperation of employers and the United Auto Workers union in pro
viding rosters of laid-off workers, signing outreach letters, and post
ing notices in union halls. Substantial rates of program participation
of about 48 percent for Phase I and 42 percent for Phase II were
achieved. These high participation rates appear to be attributable to
the targeting of program services to workers laid off from particular
plants, which defined a specific target population of workers and
limited the number of employers and local unions that had to be con
tacted for active involvement in outreach and recruitment efforts.
Eligible displaced workers who opted to participate in the Down
river program were first enrolled in an orientation and testing
program, followed by a mandatory four-day job-seeking skills work
shop. After completing the workshop, participants who indicated an
interest in retraining were evaluated by staff members before referral
so that only those likely to benefit were sent on to training programs.
Close to 60 percent of participants received some form of retraining
with the bulk of these individuals enrolling in classroom training.
Only about 13 percent of trainees were enrolled in on-the-job train
ing, in part because OJT positions with local firms were difficult to
secure. CT programs were contracted out to local educational insti
tutions, usually under a performance-based contract. Under this con
tracting scheme, reimbursement of training costs is based partly or
entirely on contractor performance as measured by both the number
of trainees completing the course and the number of trainees placed
in jobs after training.
Table 3.2 indicates the three outcome measures used in the Down
river program evaluation carried out by Abt Associates and reported
by Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984). The placement rate mea
sures the percentage of workers ever reemployed during the ob
servation period measured from the date of layoff to the survey
interview date. Observation periods for Downriver participants
averaged about two-and-one-half years. To capture the stability of
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Table 3.2
Net Impact Estimates for Major Displaced Worker Demonstrations8
Demon
stration
project

Place
ment
rate

Outcome measure
Ave.
Employ
wkly.
Ave.
earnings'1 hours
ment0

Downriver13
Phase I:
21.4%** 20.1%**
BASF (1)
18.4**
17.0**
(2)
6.1*
DANA (1)
18.8*
5.8*
8.7*
(2)
Phase II:
Ford
MCC (1) -38.4** -9.4
-5.6
(2) -19.2*
Buffalo
Target plant
Nontarget
plant
Texas WAD
Men:
Houston
El Paso
Women:
Houston
El Paso
New Jersey UI

31**
6

33**
11

2.1wks.
0.7
1.7
3.1**

Weeks
UI
benefits6 of UIf

$110.9**
44.4**
121.8*
33.1*
-2.3
-18.9
115**
96**

13.6%**
7.6**

750
770

-$210
-170

0
1,070**

200
-130
-108

-0.62

Sources: Downriver: Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: tables 3.4 and 3.6); Buffalo:
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: table IV.3); Texas WAD: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit
7.2); and New Jersey: Corson, et al. (1989: table 2).
d** and * signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent and 10
percent confidence levels, respectively.
bFor Phase I, (1) signifies that Lear-Siegler only is the comparison plant; while (2) signifies
that Lear-Siegler and Chrysler Foundry are the comparison plants. For Phase II, (1) signifies
that Chrysler Assembly only is the comparison plant; while (2) signifies that Chrysler Assem
bly and Chrysler Foundry are the comparison plants.
cFor Downriver and Buffalo, measured as the percentage of weeks employed during the
observation period; for Texas WAD, measured as number of weeks worked during postassignment quarters 3 and 4. Quarterly employment rate estimates for New Jersey are reported
in table 3.7.
dMeasured weekly for Downriver and Buffalo and annually for Texas WAD. Quarterly esti
mates for New Jersey are reported in table 3.7.
eMeasured over 30 weeks for Texas WAD and over the benefit year for New Jersey. The New
Jersey estimate is constructed as a weighted average of separate treatment effects.
Constructed as a weighted average of separate treatment effects.
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employment following layoff, the employment rate measures for
each worker the fraction of weeks employed during the observation
period. Finally, average weekly earnings are calculated as total earn
ings from layoff to interview divided by the number of weeks in the
observation period. A number of measured variables which differed
between the program-eligible and comparison groups and which
were thought to influence reemployment experience are controlled
for using regression analysis. These control variables include worker
characteristics such as age, race, marital status, schooling, work ex
perience, and tenure and occupation in the pre-layoff job. Also in
cluded is a dummy variable for each plant. No attempt was made to
control for sample selectivity except for the inclusion in the regres
sion models of explanatory variables likely to affect program partic
ipation as well as labor market outcomes.
For Phase I of the program, the net impact estimates in table 3.2
indicate that program enrollment increased both the placement rate
and the employment rate of former BASF workers by about 20 per
centage points. These findings are especially noteworthy because of
their robustness across comparison groups. With respect to average
weekly earnings, participants enjoyed an increase in earnings over
the level they otherwise could have expected of $44 and $111, de
pending on whether Chrysler Foundry is included in the comparison
group. This sensitivity to the composition of the comparison group
may reflect, in part, the fact that Chrysler workers were the highest
paid and BASF workers the lowest paid prior to layoff of those sur
veyed. The higher estimate implies an annual earnings gain on the
order of $5,545 (assuming a 50-week work year), which is consid
erably larger than any of the estimates shown in table 2.2 for CETA
programs.
Among former DANA workers, the net impact estimates shown in
the table for placement rates and especially for employment rates,
while still positive, are smaller than those obtained for the BASF
group. In addition, the DANA estimates for placement rates are
much more sensitive to the composition of the comparison group.
On the other hand, the estimated net impact of the program on earn
ings is roughly the same for former DANA workers as for former
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BASF workers with the same degree of sensitivity to the composi
tion of the comparison group.
Turning to Phase II, program participation is seen to have actually
reduced the placement rate of former Ford workers during the postlayoff observation period. Participation also has a negative but not
statistically significant effect on the employment rate and on weekly
earnings. To reconcile this dramatic difference in estimates between
the two phases, Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 74-82) con
sider the effects of possible changes in program services and in the
characteristics of eligible workers and of the worsening local labor
market situation between 1980-81 and 1981-83. They conclude,
however, that the most likely explanation lies in the existence of un
measured plant-specific differences that were not completely con
trolled for by the observable variables included in the regression
models. Estimated net impacts may thus confound unmeasured plantspecific differences with the true program effects. In particular, im
portant differences in motivation may have existed between DANA
and BASF workers and Ford workers. Supporting this conclusion is
quantitative evidence indicating a shorter length of program enroll
ment and a lower rate of training completion for Ford workers. An
ecdotal evidence also suggests greater problems of absenteeism and
drug abuse in the Ford plant.
The Downriver program also sheds a limited amount of light on
the four policy questions posed in chapter 1. Beginning with the is
sue of the effectiveness of alternative program services, the only
available comparison for the Downriver program involves CT and
ISA. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 82-92) report that av
erage skill training cost per enrollee was more than twice the average
cost of ISA and that the program significantly increased access to
training programs. Nevertheless, training is found not to have signif
icantly improved participants' reemployment prospects above the as
sistance provided by ISA. The authors qualify this finding with the
caveats that (1) the sample sizes are small and (2) workers were not
randomly assigned to the CT and ISA-only treatment groups.
Concerning the next two questions, the Downriver program pro
vides evidence regarding program participation in general rather
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than the receipt of skill training only. Question 2 asks whether some
groups benefit more from training than others. The Downriver eval
uation results indicate that tenure on the pre-layoff job, age, and a
black skin color are negatively related to post-program employment
and earnings. Total labor market experience, on the other hand,
serves to enhance employment prospects. Question 3 poses the dis
tinction between the effect of training on wage rates as opposed to
reemployment. The results shown in table 3.2 for Phase I (but not,
as noted, for Phase II) indicate that program participation decreases
duration of unemployment and increases weekly earnings, with the
impact on earnings for DANA workers being particularly large rela
tive to the impact on unemployment. Without evidence on the effect
of the program on weekly hours, however, it is not possible to cal
culate its impact on average hourly wages.
Worth discussing in some detail is the approach of Downriver pro
gram planners to the final question of what to train workers to do.
Downriver staff members first attempted to identify occupations for
which demand was expected to grow in the local labor market. This
task was accomplished by reviewing economic forecasts and studies
conducted by local universities, studying trade journals, and analyz
ing labor market data collected by the Michigan Employment Secu
rity (ES) commission. Next, the actual demand for labor in the
occupations that survived this scrutiny was verified through inter
views with local employers and representatives of trade associations.
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984: 30) emphasize, however, that
[P]rogram staff were not interested in identifying firmspecific labor needs for which "customized" training
would need to be developed, as staff considered this a risky
investment. Rather, they preferred to train for occupations
for which there was sufficient demand on the part of a
number of employers, so that participants' reemployment
prospects were not tied to the fortunes of only one firm.
Once the decision on occupations was arrived upon, Downriver of
ficials invited local educational institutions to participate in design
ing curricula suitable for class-size training programs.
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The Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project
Responding to widespread layoffs and plant closings during the
early 1980s, the USDOL launched the Dislocated Worker Demon
stration Project in October 1982 with the objective of gaining a bet
ter understanding of how best to reduce the adjustment costs borne
by workers displaced from jobs in major manufacturing industries.
While the Downriver program provided some guidance for develop
ing new displaced worker program, USDOL officials took the posi
tion that it was important to test additional program models in
different economic environments. In addition, the Downriver net im
pact estimates are difficult to interpret because of the striking differ
ences between the two phases of the project and the sensitivity of
even Phase I impact estimates to the choice of comparison plants. To
provide firmer evidence on the effectiveness of retraining and other
services in assisting displaced workers, demonstration grants were
awarded to six sponsoring organizations scattered throughout the
country. The sponsoring organizations were located in Alameda
County, California; Buffalo; Milwaukee; Lehigh Valley, Pennsylva
nia; Mid-Willamette Valley, Oregon; and Yakima County, Washing
ton. Concurrently, a seventh project funded by state, local, and
private-sector sources was implemented in the Southgate area of Los
Angeles. The six projects plus the Southgate program served over
10,000 displaced workers between October 1, 1982 and September
30, 1983.
The Buffalo Dislocated Worker Program
Early in the evaluation design process, it was decided that due to
cost considerations the impact analysis should be limited to one site
only. The Buffalo program was chosen as the impact analysis site,
primarily because it offered a true control group for the majority of
the workers recruited for participation in the program. 2 It was also a
relatively successful program among the six sites, as measured by
short-term performance indicators such as the overall placement
rate. Referring back to table 3.1, the Buffalo program is seen to be
quite similar to Downriver in terms of the target population of
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displaced workers. In fact, Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: 11)
note that the Buffalo impact evaluation has the advantage that in
some respects it can be viewed as a replication of the Downriver
evaluation. On the other hand, the ability to generalize from the
evaluation findings is limited by the decision to carry out the net
impact analysis only for Buffalo.
Buffalo program services were offered to two groups of displaced
workers (1) mostly steel and auto workers displaced during 1982
from nine area plants, and (2) a more heterogeneous group of work
ers permanently laid off after 1980 from over 300 area establish
ments. About 30 percent of program slots were reserved for the latter
group. The program used three different procedures for selecting
workers for program participation. First, available program slots
were rationed through a formal lottery mechanism among workers
from six of the nine target plants. Thus, displaced workers in what is
termed the "target-plant sample" who were offered program ser
vices (or recruited) are a random sample of all workers from these
six plants. Nonrecruited workers from these plants would represent a
natural control group. Second, all workers from the three remaining
target plants were recruited for the program. Finally, workers from
the over-300 area establishments were offered program services on a
first-come, first-served basis as program slots become available. Re
cruited workers from the three remaining target plants and from the
over-300 area establishments are termed the "nontarget-plant sam
ple." For each of the two samples, labor market outcomes observed
for program participants are compared to those observed for a com
parison group consisting of (1) recruited individuals who chose not
to participate when offered services, and (2) individuals who were
not offered services.
Most of the personal and job-related characteristics of recruited
workers in the target-plant and nontarget-plant samples are quite
similar, with recruited workers being predominantly married white
males between the ages of 25 and 55 working full time in blue-collar
jobs prior to their displacement. In addition, recruited workers in
both groups experienced lengthy periods of post-displacement unem
ployment prior to program participation. On average, target-plant
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workers had been laid off more than a year before the start of the
program, while those in the nontarget-plant sample had been laid off
for about eight weeks. The other major difference between the two
samples is that the pre-layoff hourly wage of recruited workers in the
target-plant sample averaged $10.78, as opposed to an average prelayoff wage of $8.70 for recruited nontarget-plant workers. Length of
pre-layoff tenure was 10.1 years and 8.5 years, respectively, for re
cruited target-plant and nontarget-plant workers.
Buffalo Program Evaluation Results
It was noted earlier in this chapter that the Downriver program
achieved participation rates among recruited workers approaching 50
percent. Complicating the evaluation of the Buffalo program carried
out by Mathematica Policy Research are the much lower participa
tion rates for workers offered program services in both samples (16
percent among recruited target-plant workers and 28 percent among
nontarget-plant workers who applied and were offered services).
These low participation rates raise the possibility of selection bias
due to nonrandom assignment or selection of displaced workers into
the treatment and comparison groups. For the target-plant sample,
selection bias arises because recruited workers who chose not to par
ticipate in the program are included along with nonrecruited workers
from the same target plants in the comparison group. In addition to
this problem, the comparison group available for the nontarget-plant
sample is further contaminated by the presence of eligible workers
from the over-300 area enterprises who (1) chose not to apply for
program services, or (2) applied for services but were not chosen by
program staff members.
As described in the evaluation report by Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: 100-104), the selection bias problem is dealt with by
first explicitly modeling program participation. The parameter esti
mates of the participation equation are then used to construct a se
lectivity variable (i.e., the inverse Mill's ratio) which is included as
a regressor in each post-program outcome equation. The program es
timates shown in table 3.2 are calculated using this econometric ap
proach to (hopefully) obtain program effects free of selection bias.
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All four outcome variables displayed in the table are measured for
the first six post-program months.
Beginning with target-plant workers, the results in table 3.2 indi
cate that program participation has a statistically significant effect
on placement and employment rates as well as on weekly hours and
earnings. These effects are quite large, exceeding in size the Down
river Phase I results for the same outcome variables. Expressing the
coefficient estimates as percentages of pre-program mean values,
participation in the Buffalo project more than doubled the proportion
of time spent employed and increased the placement rate by more
than one-half. Increases in average weekly hours and average weekly
earnings are 135 percent and 195 percent, respectively, suggesting
that the program may have boosted hourly wages for those reemployed, at least in the short run. For the nontarget-plant sample, the
point estimates obtained are uniformly smaller than for the targetplant sample; and the main program impacts appear to be increases
in weekly hours and average earnings as opposed to improvements in
employment opportunities.
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985: 110-17) also report impact es
timates broken down by program treatment and demographic sub
groups. With respect to program treatments, the Buffalo site, as was
the case for all six sites in the demonstration project, offered partic
ipants a full range of services including ISA, CT, and OJT. Follow
ing initial orientation and assessment sessions, all Buffalo
participants were required to attend a four-day job search workshop.
About 45 percent of program participants were then channeled into
either CT or OJT positions. Area employers at each of the six sites
were offered a 50 percent wage subsidy to develop OJT slots, and
the Buffalo program provided the highest proportion of OJT posi
tions among the six sites. The 55 percent of participants who did not
receive CT or OJT were assigned to counselors/resource coordinators
and offered job development and referral services. The Buffalo pro
gram also maintained a resource .center to be used by workers in
conducting their own job search.
For the employment rate and average weekly earnings, table 3.3
presents net impact estimates disaggregated by program treatment.
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Table 3.3
Estimated Program Impacts for the Buffalo Dislocated Worker
Project, by Principal Program Treatment
Outcome variable and
Nontarget-plant
Target-plant
principal program treatment
sample
sample
Employment rate:
46**
47**
CT
OJT
13
18
33**
-6
JSA-only
Average weekly earnings:
CT
OJT
JSA-only

$122
64
134**

$141
136**
15

Source: Corson, Long and Maynard (1985: table IV.4).
Note: ** signifies that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent
confidence level.

Among target-plant workers, the results indicate that ISA and CT
had large effects of roughly the same magnitude on both outcome
measures. The strong results for CT, but not for ISA, also carried
over to the nontarget-plant estimates. Drawing on the more reliable
results for the target-plant sample, Corson, Long, and Maynard
(1985: 111-13) point out that JSA is the more cost effective of the
two treatments. The reason is that the additional effects (if any) of
CT above those of JSA are not large enough to compensate for the
higher cost of CT services. (Average costs per participants were
$851 for ISA-only, $3,282 for CT with JSA, and $3,170 for OJT
with JSA.) Note that the absence of an incremental effect of CT echos
the similar finding obtained for the earlier Downriver program. Cor
son, Long, and Maynard caution, however, that many CT participants
completed their training near the end of the demonstration period
and thus received relatively little placement assistance. Interestingly,
OJT is seen not to have much of an impact on either the employment
rate or average earnings for the target-plant sample; but it is statis
tically significant in increasing average earnings for nontarget-plant
workers. Since OJT was primarily used in the Buffalo program as a
placement tool, the absence of an effect on employment opportuni
ties suggests that the OJT treatment was unnecessary.
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Net program effects are also available broken down by sex, race,
age, education, wages and tenure on the pre-displacement job, and
availability of income support from Supplemental Unemployment
Benefit (SUB) programs. Focusing on proportion of time employed
for the target-plant sample, program impacts are found to be greater
for women than men, for individuals under age 45 than for those
older, and for workers with more than 10 years of tenure on their
pre-layoff job than for those with less tenure. Time spent employed
did not appear to be strongly affected by race, education, pre-layoff
wages, and availability of SUB income support. The result for SUB
support is important because it suggests, at least for Buffalo project
participants, that the availability of income-maintenance support did
not affect their response to program services.
Beyond the net impact results appearing in tables 3.2 and 3.3,
Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985) present a comparison of the
characteristics of the reemployment job with those of the pre-layoff
job. This analysis shows that, on average, weekly hours were re
duced from 5 to 10 percent, but that an even larger reduction oc
curred in weekly earnings, particularly for the relatively high wage
target-plant sample. For the target-plant group, about one-third had
weekly earnings of less than 50 percent of their pre-layoff weekly
earnings, while less than 20 percent showed an increase. Consider
able occupational shifting also occurred, reflecting a substantial
movement of workers to new jobs outside manufacturing, which had
been the industrial sector in which a majority of the pre-layoff jobs
were located.
One final note on the Buffalo project relates to the design of CT
programs. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984: 75-77) point out in
their overview report on all six demonstration sites that the one-year
duration of the project severely limited both the careful selection of
high growth occupations and the necessary testing and assessment
required to insure that participants possessed the motivation and nec
essary academic skills to benefit from formal classroom training. In
general, CT was limited to those occupations and training deliverers
amenable to short-duration, high-intensity courses developed on
short notice. Local employer involvement in the design of training
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programs typically took the form of recommendations of PIC com
mittees based on ". . .a relatively unsystematic impression of labormarket demand" (Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 1984: 76).

The Texas Worker Adjustment
Demonstration Projects
JTPA Title III funds began to flow to employment and training
assistance programs for displaced workers in October 1982. To un
derstand more completely the labor market effects of these pro
grams, the Texas Department of Community Affairs designed and
implemented the experimental Worker Adjustment Demonstration
(WAD) projects operated at six sites between 1983 and 1985. Avail
able for evaluation purposes are two projects in El Paso and one in
Houston. In comparison to the Downriver and Buffalo projects, an
important distinguishing feature of the WAD projects is that they
represent an attempt to evaluate an ongoing displaced worker pro
gram. In addition, as noted in table 3.1, WAD program services
were provided to groups of displaced workers other than the mostly
white male steel and auto workers who were targeted for assistance
in the Downriver and Buffalo projects. Perhaps most important, the
WAD projects applied a true experimental methodology including
random assignment of eligible workers.
As described in the Abt Associates report by Bloom and Kulik
(1986), the experimental design of the WAD projects allowed Title
III program participants to be assigned randomly to either of two
treatment groups or to a control group. The treatment groups were
supplied services by Texas' established Title III service delivery sys
tem. The first treatment group (called Tier I) received ISA services
only. Core JSA services provided at all three sites included orienta
tion, job search workshops, assessment, and job development and
placement. Members of the second treatment group received JSA
followed, if necessary, by more expensive classroom or on-the-job
retraining (the Tier I/II sequence). The control group was not eligible
for WAD services, but its members were informed of other non-Title
III services available in their communities. One difference in the ex
perimental design between the Buffalo program and the WAD
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projects should be emphasized. In the Buffalo target-plant sample,
program slots were allocated randomly among eligible workers, but
recruited workers made their own decision on whether to participate
in the program and recruited nonparticipants are included in the
comparison group. In the WAD projects, in contrast, eligible work
ers were rationed randomly to the treatment and control groups so
that recruited nonparticipants are not included in the control group.
It might also be noted that the low rate of participation for work
ers offered program services that plagued the Buffalo program was
not a problem for the WAD projects, with 71 percent of those as
signed to the WAD treatment groups choosing to participate. Bloom
and Kulik (1986: 29-31) mention, in particular, that shortfalls be
tween the number of planned and actual participants occurred almost
exclusively in connection with Tier II services; and these shortfalls
were mainly the result of overestimating provider capacity rather
than exaggerating workers' interest. In Houston, in addition, there
was an important mismatch between the types of Tier II services
supplied and the demand of the client population. This mismatch
will be discussed at greater length later in this section.
Beyond the Tier I and Tier I/II distinction, there were also impor
tant differences between the WAD sites in Houston and El Paso. In
terms of workers' personal and job-related characteristics, over 80
percent of those recruited and assigned to treatment and control
groups in the Houston project were male and about 57 percent were
white. Also represented in Houston were sizable groups of blacks and
Asians. In the two El Paso sites, in contrast, approximately 90 percent
of program eligibles were Hispanic and a majority were women. These
differences by race and sex primarily reflect the industrial orienta
tion of the projects, with the Houston program targeting its services
to highly educated, largely white-collar professional workers laid off
from petrochemical plants. In contrast, both El Paso programs fo
cused on workers with much less education displaced from apparel,
food processing, and other light manufacturing jobs. Mirroring this
difference in industry orientation, the average hourly wage of Hous
ton's eligibles was slightly over $13.00, as compared to about $5.00
for eligible workers in El Paso. Rather surprisingly, most WAD eli-
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gibles in all three sites had been employed in their pre-layoff jobs for
less than five years a considerably shorter period of time than the
seven to fifteen years of pre-layoff tenure reported for Downriver and
Buffalo displaced workers. It is perhaps worth noting that, since the
benchmark analysis of displaced workers by Flaim and Sehgal
(1985), three years of job tenure has commonly been used to distin
guish the displaced from other unemployed workers.
One final difference between WAD sites is that only for the Houston
site could the differential effect of the additional services in the Tier
I/II sequence be distinguished from Tier I JSA-only services. The
program outcome measures available for the El Paso sites are limited
to a comparison of the Tier I/II sequence and the control group.
The WAD demonstration yielded three main results. As summa
rized in table 3.2, the first is that program participants experienced
short-run positive impacts on annual earnings and weeks worked, as
well as a decrease in dollars received in UI benefits. (The ambiguous
findings for female participants in the Houston site appear to be due
to a small sample size.) More important, these impact estimates tend
to be larger and more pronounced for women than for men. In par
ticular, female participants in El Paso experienced a programinduced gain in annual earnings of $1,070. The gains in annual
earnings for men in Houston and El Paso were only $750 and $770,
respectively. Since the mostly white male Houston participants
earned more than twice as much as the mostly Hispanic female El
Paso participants prior to WAD enrollment, the gender difference in
estimated earnings gains is even more striking when expressed per
centage terms.
A second result emerges from quarter-by-quarter program impact
estimates calculated by sex across all three sites and shown in table
3.4. A large and statistically significant earnings gain of $500 oc
curred for men in the second post-assignment quarter only, and the
total net impact estimate for the year is not significantly different
from zero due to its large standard error. The time pattern in these
results indicates that the main effect of the program was to enable
male participants to find jobs sooner than would have otherwise
been the case. But ultimately, the employment opportunities of pro-
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Table 3.4
Estimated Program Impact on Quarterly
Earnings for the Texas WAD Projects, by Sex
Earnings in postassignment quarter
Men
Women
$480**
Quarter 1
$110
500**
330**
Quarter 2
40
160
Quarter 3
130
Quarter 4
-110
890**
Total
790
Source: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit 7.1).
Note: ** signifies that the program is statistically signifi
cant at the 5 percent level.

gram participants were no better and the wages of participants no
higher than for members of the control group. For women, similarly,
WAD participation increased earnings on average by $480 in the
first post-program quarter, followed by gradually decaying impacts
for subsequent quarters. For the year as a whole, however, Bloom
and Kulik report a statistically significant net impact estimate of
$890, suggesting that female participants may have enjoyed a per
manent gain from program participation. 3
The final result involves the differential effect of Tier I versus Tier
I/II services for males in the Houston program. Average program
costs per participant were $1,531 for Tier I and $4,991 for Tier I/II.
Consistent with the results of the Downriver and Buffalo projects,
skill training (which was almost exclusively classroom training) fails
to increase earnings and employment above the effects of ISA-only
services. In fact, taking at face value the net impact estimates shown
in table 3.5, the differential impact of retraining is seen to be nega
tive for annual earnings and weeks worked. The incremental effect of
retraining services on total UI benefits is exactly zero.
Bloom and Kulik (1986: 170-73) take considerable care in inter
preting these negative results for skill training. One explanation they
offer is that the addition of a retraining program is likely to cause
participants to delay undertaking serious job search until after the
training period is completed. If, as just indicated, the primary pro
gram effect for men is to expedite their reemployment and this effect
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Table 3.5
Net Impact Estimates for Men in the Houston WAD Project,
____________by Program Treatment____________
Differential
Outcome measure____Tier I-only
Tierl/II
impact
Earnings for the post$860
$680
-$180
assignment year
Weeks worked in postassignment quarters
3 and 4
Total UI benefits for
the 30 week post-

4.3**

-$220

0.6

-$220

3.7

0

assignment period__________________________
Source: Bloom and Kulik (1986: exhibit 7.3).
Note: ** signifies that the program effect is statistically significant at the 5 per
cent level.

occurs soon after the receipt of ISA services, a delay in beginning
the job search process will reduce reemployment rates.
A second explanation considered more realistic by the authors is
the mismatch between the retraining opportunities offered and the
interests and backgrounds of the target group. The classroom train
ing programs provided by the Houston Community College were
primarily technical/vocational in nature, offering retraining in occu
pations including air conditioning and refrigeration and computer
maintenance technology. At the same time, as noted, Houston pro
gram participants were well educated, highly paid former whitecollar workers who presumably had little interest in training courses
in skilled manual trades. Further complicating matters was a lack of
integration of the ISA and CT program components caused by poor
communication between the Tier I and Tier II contractors. It is there
fore not surprising that the take-up of retraining was low and the
payoff limited. In their recommendations for future Title III pro
gramming, Bloom and Kulik (1986: 179-82) suggest that (1) ISA
should be the core service provided in displaced worker programs,
and (2) skill training should be offered to fewer, more carefully
screened participants who can be better matched to training opportu-
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nities that are potentially available in the community. At the same
time, however, they conclude that the cost effectiveness of high qual
ity, accurately targeted skill training remains an open issue.

The New Jersey UI Reemployment
Demonstration Project
Like the Texas WAD projects, the New Jersey Unemployment In
surance (UI) Reemployment Demonstration was intended to examine
the effectiveness of an ongoing program in this case, the operation
of the UI system. The UI system provides short-term income support
to involuntarily unemployed individuals while they actively seek
work. It also attempts to assist in the reemployment of unemployed
workers by referring them either to the ES for placement services or
to retraining programs offered under JTPA. In recent years, however,
a number of critics of the present UI system have argued that the
primary reemployment problem encountered by workers displaced
from their jobs by plant closures or mass layoffs is not one of riding
out a temporary spell of unemployment until a cyclical upturn oc
curs. Since the displaced face longer-term reemployment difficulties,
these critics suggest instead that what is needed is the targeting of
more intensive reemployment assistance, including skill training, to
permanently separated UI claimants who would otherwise be unable
to qualify for vacant jobs in growing industries.4 To increase their
effectiveness, moreover, both critics and supporters of the present UI
system agree that these reemployment services should be provided
before or soon after layoffs take place (see Leigh 1989: chap. 4).
Initiated by the USDOL and operated as a joint venture by the
USDOL and the New Jersey Department of Labor, the New Jersey
Demonstration was implemented in July 1986 and program services
were continued into the fall of 1987. In response to the recent criti
cisms of the UI system, the project had two primary objectives. The
first is to assess the feasibility of an "early intervention" strategy.
At issue are the questions of whether and how it is possible to use
the UI system to identify early in the claim period unemployed
workers who are likely to face prolonged spells of unemployment
and exhaust UI benefits. "Early" is defined operationally as the
fifth week of claiming UI benefits.
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The Demonstration's second objective is to empirically measure
the effectiveness of three alternative packages of reemployment ser
vices in accelerating the return to work. The three packages of ser
vices designated Treatments 1, 2, and 3, respectively are ISAonly, ISA combined with training or relocation assistance, and ISA
combined with a cash bonus for early reemployment. Demonstration
services were provided at each of 10 sites by four-person teams con
sisting of three ES staff members and a JTPA staff member from the
local Service Delivery Area operator. ES staff provided all of the
services for the ISA-only and ISA plus reemployment bonus treat
ments, and existing ITPA local program operators were responsible
for identifying appropriate training opportunities and placing claim
ants in training programs.

Program Design and Implementation
Beginning with the first objective, the basic problem is to distin
guish displaced workers from those unemployed for cyclical, frictional, or seasonal reasons, so that "unneeded" services are not
provided to workers reasonably anticipating recall to their old jobs
or otherwise expected to have little difficulty in locating new
employment. The clearest way to make this distinction is by looking
at the length of completed unemployment spells. The longer the
spell, the more likely it is that an unemployed worker is truly dis
placed. Unfortunately, this approach is not of much help in making
decisions early in the spell of unemployment on which workers
should be targeted for assistance. Assistance might also be restricted
to workers displaced from their jobs by a mass permanent layoff
or a plant closure. This was the targeting strategy used in the Down
river project described earlier. But this approach neglects the adjust
ment assistance needs of job losers adversely affected by the ripple
effect of a large plant closure or mass layoff in causing suppliers
to the closed plant and local retail and service outlets to lay off
employees.
The approach taken by New lersey program designers to distin
guish the displaced from other unemployed workers was to apply
five "screens" during the fourth week of claiming benefits. The cu
mulative effect of these screens is to define the displaced to be UI
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claimants 25 years of age and older who had at least three years of
tenure with their last employer prior to being laid off and who could
not provide a specific date at which they expected to be recalled. As
noted in table 3.1, slightly more than 11,000 claimants passed
through these screens during the July 1986-June 1987 period and
were randomly assigned to the three treatment groups and the control
group. Men and women were about equally represented in the eligi
ble population, and there were sizable proportions of blacks (17.2
percent) and Hispanics (19.5 percent) as well as of workers age 55
and older (22 percent). Regarding industry mix, about 47 percent of
the eligible population was laid off from manufacturing jobs; 20 per
cent and 16 percent, respectively, were displaced from jobs in whole
sale and retail trade and services. The average pre-layoff wage for
eligible workers was $403 per week, and about two-thirds of these
workers were employed five years or longer on their pre-layoff jobs.
Turning to the second objective of the Demonstration, all three
treatments began with a common set of initial services delivered,
starting in the fifth week of unemployment. After receipt of a noti
fication letter, claimants were to report to a Demonstration office
(usually an ES office) for orientation and testing. In the following
week, they attended a week-long, half-day job search workshop.
This was followed a week later by a one-on-one counseling/assess
ment session. These initial services were considered mandatory, and
failure to report could lead to the denial of UI benefits.
Beginning with the counseling/assessment interview, the services
offered to members of the three treatment groups diverged. Claim
ants receiving Treatment 1 services the ISA-only group were ex
pected to make periodic contact with the Demonstration office,
either by stopping by to discuss job search activities with staff mem
bers or by making use of the resource center situated in the office.
Resource centers typically contained job listings, telephones, and oc
cupational and training literature.
Claimants in the second treatment group were also informed about
the resource center and the requirement to maintain periodic contact
with the Demonstration office during the job search process. In ad
dition, they were offered the opportunity to enroll in a CT or OJT
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program. Acceptable CT programs which were offered by a wide
range of public and private training providers were subject to the
restrictions that their expected duration not exceed six months and
that remedial education be offered only if necessary to enable claim
ants to progress to vocational training courses. The two major areas
of CT were business and office and computer and information sci
ences. Corson et al. (1989: 109, 111) note that the average cost per
trainee of CT ($2,723) was low in comparison to the typical experi
ence in New Jersey JTPA programs because the courses were de
signed to upgrade claimants' skills rather than to provide training in
a whole new vocational area. An example they cite of skill upgrad
ing is that an individual with accounting skills might be trained to
use a spreadsheet package on a personal computer.
Employers who provided OJT slots to claimants eligible for Treat
ment 2 services received a wage subsidy of 50 percent; and about
half of the OJT jobs were in technical, clerical, and sales occupa
tions. Average cost of OJT per trainee was $1,960. Finally, Treat
ment 2 claimants were told about the availability of relocation
assistance which, if they elected not to pursue training, could be
used to pay for moving expenses and for job interview trips exceed
ing 50 miles in length. Consistent with the experience of earlier
demonstrations, very few Treatment 2 claimants opted to take advan
tage of relocation assistance.
The reemployment bonus concept made operational in Treatment 3
is directed at the problem that the reemployment of displaced work
ers may be delayed, not by inadequate job search skills, but by a
lack of motivation to engage in search or by the natural reluctance to
accept a new job offering considerably lower wages and benefits than
the pre-layoff job. 5 The New Jersey reemployment bonus treatment
worked as follows. During the counseling/assessment interview,
claimants selected for this treatment were informed of the specifics
of the bonus program. If they decided to participate, they could col
lect the maximum bonus by locating and accepting a job during the
next two weeks. The maximum bonus was specified to be one-half of
the claimant's remaining UI entitlement at the time of the interview.
(The maximum bonus averaged $1,644.) After the two-week period
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had passed, the size of the bonus decreased by 10 percent per week,
reaching zero at the end of the eleventh week after the counseling/
assessment interview. A bonus payment was made only to partici
pants who obtained full-time employment with a new employer
lasting four weeks or longer. Furthermore, the payment of the bonus
was tied to length of job tenure. At the end of four weeks of em
ployment, the claimant received 60 percent of the bonus with the
remaining 40 percent received only after 12 weeks of employment.
With the exception of the reemployment bonus and relocation as
sistance, the Demonstration services were similar to existing JTPA
retraining programs and ES placement assistance supplied to unem
ployed New Jersey residents. An important difference is that claimants
in the Demonstration had a considerably higher chance of receiving
services. Moreover, Demonstration services were generally provided
earlier in the unemployment spell than were existing services.
Evaluation Results
The evaluation of the New Jersey Demonstration was carried out
by Mathematica Policy Research. Corson and Kerachsky (1987) dis
cuss preliminary results for the first six months of program opera
tion following its implementation in July 1986, and Corson et al.
(1989) present final program evaluation results. Regarding the Dem
onstration's first objective, Corson et al. suggest that the five
screens used do satisfactorily identify claimants who, in the absence
of additional employment services, would be likely to experience
difficulty in becoming reemployed. Sizable fractions of the eligible
population were older, previously employed in manufacturing, and
displaced from their jobs by a plant closure or the elimination of a
shift. Moreover, the eligible population includes a substantial propor
tion of black and Hispanic workers. It is also important to note that
the eligible population experienced longer UI durations and a higher
UI exhaustion rate than the ineligible population. Cases in which the
screening procedure tended to break down include individuals from
growing industries like services, and claimants who eventually re
turned to their former employer and presumably did not require pro
gram services.
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With respect to the second objective, strengths of the New Jersey
Demonstration are its broad coverage of state residents and its large
sample size. As is true for the Buffalo demonstration project, how
ever, the assessment of Treatment 2 services is made more difficult
by a low degree of participation in retraining programs. Of those
who passed through the counseling/assessment interview and were
offered training, only about 15 percent chose to participate. Most of
these participants were enrolled in a CT program. While this partic
ipation rate is higher than the rate for noneligible claimants exposed
to regular JTPA retraining services, it is not as high as might be
expected on the basis of earlier demonstration projects. Corson et al.
(1989: 113-15) speculate that this lower than expected participation
rate may be because (1) the offer of retraining early in the layoff
period comes before claimants recognize that they could benefit from
training services; (2) program eligible claimants who agreed to as
sessment and counseling sessions (and were offered training) as a
requirement to collect UI would presumably be less interested in
training programs than those who attended the initial sessions volun
tarily, as was the case for some other demonstrations; and (3) inad
equacies in the screening procedure mean that some individuals
offered training simply did not need it.
Since Treatments 1 and 3, in particular, are intended to lead to
more rapid reemployment of participating claimants, it is expected
that the amount of UI benefits received by treatment group members
will be less than the amount received by the control group. This
expectation is borne out in the negative and statistically significant
net impact estimates in table 3.6. Although random assignment as
sures in principle that differences in mean outcomes for the treatment
groups and the control group provide unbiased net impact estimates,
the estimates reported are coefficients estimated from a simple re
gression model containing dummy variables to represent the three
treatments and controlling for differences in claimants' individual
characteristics, ES offices, and the timing of sample selection.
Looking first at the ISA-only treatment in table 3.6, program par
ticipation reduces UI benefits by $87 over the benefit year an esti
mate that is considerably less than the -$200 calculated over 30
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Table 3.6
Estimated Program Impacts on UI Receipt for the New Jersey
UI Reemployment Demonstration, by Program Treatment
JSA plus
JSA plus
reemployment bonus
training
JSA-only
UI measure
170***
-81*
-87*
Dollars paid in
benefit year
0.97***
-0.48**
-0.47*
Weeks paid in
benefit year
-0.93**
-0.53**
-0.59**
Weeks paid in
first spell
Exhaustion rate

-0.028**

-0.017

-0.037***

Source: Corson et al. (1989: table 2).
Note: *, **, and *** signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the
10, 5, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively.

weeks for the Texas WAD projects. The $87 estimate represents
about a 3 percent reduction in average benefits paid to the control
group. ISA-only is further seen to decrease weeks of UI receipt dur
ing the first UI spell and during the benefit year and to reduce the
exhaustion rate of claimants. The slightly larger effect for weeks paid
in the first spell than for weeks paid over the entire benefit year
^suggests that a few individuals who stopped collecting UI because of
ISA subsequently collected additional benefits later in their bene
fit year.
Skipping over Treatment 2 for the moment, JSA plus the reemployment bonus is expected to have the largest impact of the three
treatments because of the substantial reemployment incentive created
by the bonus. The differences between Treatment 3 and Treatment 1
estimates are significantly different from zero indicating a sizable
incremental effect of the bonus in speeding up reemployment. Cor
son et al. (1989: 266) suggest that the more appropriate comparison
is between Treatment 1 and 3 claimants who received the counseling/
assessment interview. Focusing on these individuals, the reemploy
ment bonus offer by itself reduced UI benefits by $101 over the
benefit year and weeks paid in the benefit year by 0.69. These esti-
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mates are somewhat smaller than the impacts of UI receipt reduc
tions of $158 in benefit payments and 1.15 weeks paid over the ben
efit year estimated by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) for the
Illinois Claimant Bonus Experiment. 6
Treatment 2 is expected to have the smallest short-run effect on UI
receipt of the three treatments since individuals undergoing training
continued to receive UI benefits. Consistent with this expectation,
the impact estimates presented in table 3.6 indicate that the offer of
training assistance on top of the basic ISA services provided in
Treatment 1 did not appreciably affect the UI outcomes examined.
This result is understandable since the low take-up rate of the offer
of training would dilute any program effect when measured over the
entire treatment group.
Table 3.7 expands the net impact analysis to include estimates of
the effects of the three program treatments on proportion of time
employed, earnings, and the post-UI wage rate. Data on the first
two of these outcome measures are obtained from a follow-up in
terview that allows the measurement of quarter-by-quarter effects
for the first four quarters following the claim filing date. State ad
ministrative records, which do not lend themselves to measuring
the timing of program impacts, are the source of the wage data.
For Treatment 1, the first quarter impact of ISA is to raise the em
ployment rate of program participants 2.3 percentage points above
that of the control group. As indicated in the table, this estimate
represents a 16.2 percent increase in employment relative to the con
trol group mean. In subsequent quarters, the point estimates are
higher, but they represent smaller percentages of control group
means, and the percentage impact estimates decline over time. Sim
ilarly, the quarterly earnings estimates show a large initial impact
of 18.2 percent, which declines over time to essentially zero by quar
ter 4. Taken in conjunction with the quarterly earnings estimates
displayed in table 3.4 for the Texas WAD projects, this evidence
appears to be quite clear in indicating that ISA is effective in en
couraging rapid reemployment. Its relatively low cost, moreover,
means that in the cost-benefit analysis performed by Corson et al.
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JSA comes the closest of the three treatments to paying for itself in
terms of reduced UI outlays.
Turning to Treatment 2, the quarterly net impact estimates shown
in table 3.7 for JSA plus training are uniformly smaller than those
for JSA only (with the exception of earnings in quarter 4). This re
sult is not unexpected since individuals enrolled in training would
remain unemployed for the duration of their training program.
Rather than a significant short-run effect, the benefits of retraining
are expected to show up in the longer run as upgraded skills pay off
in increased employment stability and possibly higher wages. In an
attempt to measure the longer-run impact of training, earnings im
pacts in quarters 5 and 6 were estimated with the result that Treat
ment 2 had no discernable effect in either quarter. (The point
estimates are $2 in quarter 5 and -$124 in quarter 6, and neither
estimate is statistically significant.) Before interpreting these results
as further evidence of the ineffectiveness of skill training, however,
Corson et al (1989: 14) caution that
. . . since relatively few individuals in the JSA plus training
treatment actually received training, and since sufficient
time had not elapsed to observe post-training employment
outcomes for all these individuals, these findings should
be considered inconclusive as they pertain to the value of
training per se for the demonstration-eligible population.
The Treatment 3 results presented in table 3.7 indicate for the first
two quarters that JSA plus the offer of a reemployment bonus has a
larger impact on employment and earnings than JSA-only. These dif
ferences between treatment impacts, however, are not as large as
might be expected on the basis of the results in table 3.6 for UI
receipt. By quarter 3, the effects of Treatment 3 on employment and
earnings are seen to have declined sharply; and the quarter 3 and
quarter 4 estimates are exceeded by the corresponding JSA-only es
timates. It seems reasonable to conclude that the impact of Treatment
3 on employment and earnings primarily represents the early reem
ployment generated by JSA.
An important concern, especially with respect to the reemploy
ment bonus, is that the effect of the treatments in accelerating reem-
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Table 3.7
Estimated Program Impacts on Employment, Earnings, and Post-UI
Wages for the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration,
by Program Treatment
Outcome
JSA plus
JSA plus
JSA-only
measure
reemployment bonus
training
Employment rate:
2.3**
2 §***
1 9**
Quarter 1
(16.2)
(19.7)
(13.4)
4 2***
5.0***
2.8*
Quarter 2
(12.4)
(12.6)
(7.0)
4 3**
2.3
2.2
Quarter 3
(4.1)
(7.7)
(3.9)
0.6
2.8
Quarter 4
1.7
(1.0)
(4.5)
(2.7)
Earnings:
Quarter 1
Quarter 2
Quarter 3
Quarter 4
% change in post-UI
wage relative to
pre-UI wage

$125**
(18.2)
263**
(13.5)
171
(6.3)
49
(1.6)
0.041**

$82
(11-9)
103
(5.3)
83
(3.1)
77
(2.6)
0.030**

$160***
(23.3)
278***
(14.3)
131
(4.9)
22
(0.7)
0.041**

Source: Corson et al. (1989: tables VI.2-VI.7 and VI. 11).
Notes: Quarters are defined relative to the date of the initial UI claim, and numbers in
parentheses are impact estimates expressed as percentages of control group means. *, **, and
*** signify that the program effect is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.

ployment may have occurred because participants accepted a less fa
vorable job match (thereby sacrificing earnings). The hourly wage
results shown in the last row of table 3.7 suggest that this concern is
groundless. In fact, all three treatments appear to have led to a mod
est increase in the wages paid in post-UI jobs. Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) report a similar finding for the Illinois Claimant
Bonus Experiment. Their conclusion is that the faster reemployment
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of Illinois program participants resulted from more intense job
search effort, and not from overly rapid acceptance of job offers.
In addition to the results described in tables 3.6 and 3.7, Corson
et al. provide an analysis of the impact of the treatments disaggre
gated by population subgroups. This analysis suggests that the treat
ments were most successful at promoting the reemployment of
displaced workers possessing marketable skills, such as clerical and
other white-collar workers. The treatments were less successful in
assisting those workers the authors describe as facing "hard-core,
structural unemployment problems." The latter group includes bluecollar workers, workers displaced from jobs in durable-goods manu
facturing, and permanently separated workers. One reason for the
relatively favorable reemployment prospects of white-collar workers
is found in recent evidence indicating that there is a high degree of
transferability of skills for this group. Using 1984 DWS data for
men, Kletzer (1989) shows that there is an important difference be
tween blue-collar workers and managerial, professional, and techni
cal workers in the contribution of pre-displacement job tenure to
explaining post-displacement weekly earnings. To bring out this
point, she calculates the following earnings elasticities with respect
to tenure on the old and new jobs:

Old job
New job

Blue-collar
.02673
.00691

White-collar
.03224
.02613

These estimates suggest that the marginal contribution of previous
job tenure to post-displacement earnings is just 25.8 percent of its
contribution to pre-displacement earnings for blue-collar workers
(.258 = .00691/.02673). For white-collar workers, on the other
hand, this percentage rises to 81.0 percent. In other words, the skills
possessed by blue-collar workers are more likely to be job-specific
and thus nontransferable to the post-displacement job than those pos
sessed by white-collar workers.
The conclusion that New Jersey Demonstration services were pri
marily of assistance to displaced workers who already enjoyed rela-
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tively favorable reemployment prospects is not terribly surprising in
view of the fact, noted earlier, that CT was designed to upgrade ex
isting skills rather than to develop entirely new skills. Despite the
absence of a measurable short-run effect of skill training, Corson et
al. (1989: 342) therefore argue that longer-run, more intensive ser
vices are needed for displaced workers who face major structural dis
locations. In support of this argument, they cite the high rate at
which otherwise eligible workers were excused from testing and job
search workshops as evidence suggesting that referrals to Englishas-a-Second-Language or remedial education services may be needed
for some displaced individuals.

Summary
The four demonstration projects discussed in this chapter have the
common purpose of quantitatively assessing the labor market effec
tiveness for displaced workers of retraining programs. These pro
grams include different mixes of three reemployment services ISA,
CT, and OJT. Although they have a common objective, the projects
differ considerably in terms of geographic location, experimental de
sign, and the target populations of displaced workers served. This
summary section attempts to pull together the plethora of net impact
estimates reported for the different demonstrations by asking what
light the results can shed on the four policy questions posed in chap
ter 1.
Beginning with the issue of whether some types of training work
better than others, the Buffalo, Texas WAD, and New Jersey projects
are unanimous in indicating that ISA services have the intended ef
fect on a variety of labor market outcomes. These include earnings,
placement and employment rates, and amount of UI benefits. Given
the relatively low cost per worker of ISA, this evidence suggests
also that ISA services are cost effective.
For the other reemployment services, evidence gathered for all
four demonstrations indicates that CT fails to have a sizable incre
mental effect on earnings, employment, and UI benefits above that
of ISA-only. It certainly does not appear to be the case that the ad
ditional effect of CT is large enough to compensate for the higher
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cost of CT services. The authors of the major evaluation reports of
fer a number of caveats for their findings including the difficulty of
drawing reliable inferences from small sample sizes, the problem
that program participants undergoing skill training have relatively
little time left to receive placement assistance (given demonstration
periods of fixed length), the scarcity of training providers capable of
putting together high-quality, short-duration training courses on
short notice, and the possibility that the classroom training provided
is either not saleable in the local labor market or not of particular
interest to the client population.
Regarding on-the-job training, the Buffalo project is probably the
only one of the four demonstrations with enough participants placed in
OJT slots to provide reasonably reliable estimates of the net impact
of OJT programs. Contrary to the CETA results discussed in chapter
2, OJT is not found to consistently have a positive effect on earnings
for Buffalo trainees. Nor does it have much of an effect on employ
ment rates. Since OJT was primarily used in the Buffalo program as
a placement tool, it appears that this service was unnecessary.
The next question asked whether some groups of displaced work
ers benefitted more from program services than others. Probably the
strongest evidence relating to differences in program effects by race
or ethnicity and sex is found in the results obtained for the Texas
WAD projects. In terms of earnings and employment, female partic
ipants in the two El Paso projects are found to enjoy much larger net
impact estimates than males in the El Paso and Houston projects.
The gender differences between program sites are even more impres
sive when it is recognized that a majority of male Houston partici
pants are white, whereas female El Paso participants are largely
Hispanic. Reinforcing the WAD results is evidence from the Buffalo
project indicating larger effects for women than men. The Buffalo
project also suggests that little difference in net impact estimates ex
ists for blacks and whites, but that workers under age 45 benefit
more from program services than do older workers.
Rather than race/ethnicity and sex differences, the results of the
New Jersey Demonstration emphasize the distinction between work
ers with marketable skills and workers facing long-term, structural
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reemployment problems. In New Jersey, clerical and other whitecollar workers are examples of the former group, while blue-collar
workers laid off from durable goods manufacturing jobs typify the
latter. In view of the Demonstration's objective of encouraging rapid
reemployment through the UI system, it is not surprising that pro
gram services primarily assisted workers with marketable skills.
The third question posed in chapter 1 raises the issue of whether
training, to the extent that it improves reemployment prospects at all,
works by increasing post-training wages or by speeding up the reem
ployment process. For all program services combined, the Buffalo
project permits the calculation of short-run program effects on
weekly hours and average weekly earnings. The larger percentage
effect on average weekly earnings than on weekly hours suggests
that the Buffalo program boosted hourly wages for those reemployed
during the first six post-program months. For all three of its program
treatments, evidence from the New Jersey Demonstration also indi
cates that program participation has a small positive impact on
wages for reemployed claimants.
In contrast, the more detailed quarter-by-quarter program impact
estimates calculated for the Texas WAD projects and the New Jersey
Demonstration raise questions about whether this short-run positive
effect on wage rates persists over time. For both men and women,
the time pattern of the WAD results shows that the program in
creased quarterly earnings in the first and second quarters, followed
by gradually decaying impacts for subsequent quarters. Similar re
sults broken down by program treatment are obtained for both em
ployment and earnings in the New Jersey Demonstration. Thus,
while the reemployment process was accelerated by program ser
vices in both cases, participants' employment opportunities appear
ultimately to be no better and their wages no higher than those of the
members of the control group. There is no evidence, in other words,
from either the WAD projects or the New Jersey Demonstration that
program services permanently increased labor productivity.
The final issue raised in chapter 1 is what should workers be
trained to do? A valuable contribution of the demonstration projects
discussed in this chapter is to make apparent the difficulty in a short-
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duration demonstration of developing solid training curricula that
meet the market test of providing saleable skills. Of the four demon
strations, Downriver program planners probably paid the most atten
tion to the problem of providing retraining in occupations expected
to be in high demand. Yet, the skill training programs provided to
Downriver trainees are not found to have a significant incremental
effect in improving reemployment prospects above those for ISAonly recipients. The WAD projects also emphasize that one reason
for low program take-up rates and modest net impact estimates is
that CT curricula may not match the backgrounds and perceived
needs of client workers.
NOTES
1. The other two major titles are Title II, which provides training to disadvantaged youth and
adults and summer jobs to disadvantaged youth, and Title IV, which authorizes training pro
grams directly administered by the USDOL for native Americans, seasonal and migrant work
ers, and veterans.
2. Services were delivered at all six sites, however, and a detailed description of program
design and implementation issues for the entire demonstration is found in Corson, Maynard,
and Wichita (1984).
3. Bloom and Kulik (1986: 178-79) note also that, with the exception of women in Houston,
control group members were able to locate new jobs paying nearly as much as they earned in
their pre-layoff jobs. Thus, it is not surprising that the main effect of the WAD program was
expediting the reemployment of participants at wages comparable to what they previously
earned. The authors go on to suggest that with its client population of workers who appeared
to be experiencing only short-run unemployment problems, there is some question whether the
WAD demonstration captured the labor market circumstances faced by truly displaced workers.
4. As will be discussed in chapter 5, the Canadian federal government recently announced a
policy change that specifies a more active role in the reemployment process for the UI pro
gram in that country. As of 1990, Canada's Labour Force Development Strategy requires that
10 percent of total UI expenditures must be spent on programs to upgrade the skills of unem
ployed workers, as well as on maternity, child care, and older worker programs.
5. The initial test of the reemployment bonus concept in this country took the form of two
controlled experiments carried out in Illinois between mid-1984 and mid-1985. In the Claimant
Bonus Experiment, a random sample of new UI claimants was told that they would receive a
cash bonus of $500 upon reemployment. In the Employer Bonus Experiment, another random
sample of new UI claimants was instructed that, once a hiring commitment was made, the
employer of each newly hired claimant would be eligible for a $500 cash bonus. In contrast to
the generally statistically insignificant Employer Experiment results, Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) find that, on average, the claimant bonus reduced UI benefits by $158 and duration
of insured unemployment by 1.15 weeks, where both outcome variables are measured over the
benefit year.
6. Corson et al. (1989: 266, fn. 10) discuss the differences between the Illinois and the New
Jersey reemployment bonus experiments that make this comparison not quite appropriate.
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Beginning with MDTA in 1962 and continuing through the Eco
nomic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA)
passed in 1988, chapters 2 and 3 briefly described the evolution of
federal programs developed to supply displaced workers with adjust
ment assistance services. For most of the 1980s, however, the Re
agan administration's philosophy of new federalism made the states
the key intergovernmental player in developing social policy initia
tives including the establishment of new employment and training
programs. In a recent survey of state training programs, Stevens
(1986) points out that only six states do not commit funds to subsi
dize programs that offer either classroom or on-the-job training.
Before looking at the details of particular state programs, it is
useful to draw attention to two important features that distinguish
state-funded initiatives in general from those provided by the federal
government. l First, while only unemployed workers are currently el
igible for Title III JTPA services, state programs are typically of
fered in addition to employed workers at risk of being permanently
laid off if their skills are not upgraded. Second, many states have
addressed the critical issue of what to retrain displaced workers to do
by tailoring training programs to meet the needs of individual em
ployers. This means that state programs have the economic develop
ment objective of creating new jobs, in addition to the traditional
view of retraining as a human capital investment intended to raise
the level of workers' skills to enable them to qualify for existing
jobs. Federal programs, in contrast, generally are designed to qualify
program graduates for jobs, in what are anticipated to be highdemand occupations. In the case of the federally funded Downriver
demonstration project, for example, chapter 3 pointed out that pro
gram planners made the explicit decision not to tailor training pro
grams to meet firm-specific labor demands.
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Table 4.1
Major Features of California's ETP and Minnesota's MEED
Programs and the Dayton Experiment
Services
Funding
Targeted
Program
workers
provided
mechanism
California's
ETP

UI recipients, recent
UI exhaustees, and
employed workers at
risk of layoff

Payment to providers
of CT and OJT to
cover direct program
costs. Training provid
ers may be either the
employer requesting
the project or a train
ing institution.

Diversion of UI
tax revenues

Minnesota's
MEED

Unemployed work
ers not eligible for
UI or workers' com
pensation. Priority
given to General
Assistance and
AFDC eligibles.

Subsidies of up to $4
per hour in wages and
up to $1 per hour in
fringes paid to small
employers

General state
tax revenues

Dayton
experiment

AFDC and General
Assistance recipients

Wage vouchers paid to
employers in the form
of either a tax credit
or a direct cash pay
ment. Vouchers equal
to 50% of first-year
earnings and 25% of
second-year earnings.

Federally
funded

The first state initiative considered in this chapter California's
Employment Training Panel (ETP) is the largest and undoubtedly
the best known of ongoing state training programs. In addition, ETP
is among the few state programs for which quantitative evaluation
evidence is available. The Minnesota Employment and Economic
Development (MEED) program is examined next as an example of
the wage-subsidy approach to training and economic development.
Presented in connection with the MEED program is quantitative
evidence obtained for the federally funded Dayton targeted wagesubsidy experiment. Table 4.1 highlights some of the major differ
ences between these three programs with respect to targeted
workers, the services provided, and funding mechanisms.
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California's ETP

Major Program Features
Begun in January 1983, ETP receives state funding of $55 million
per year to be used for retraining current UI recipients, recent UI
exhaustees, and workers currently employed (and covered by the UI
system) but in danger of being laid off due to changes in technology
or other changes in the workplace. Individual training projects eligi
ble for ETP funding must provide at least 100 hours of instruction
consisting of either CT or OJT. Projects are initially funded for up to
18 months, with possible contract extensions for as long as two
years. Since its inception, the Panel has taken pride in noting that its
staff, not the employer, does the paperwork; and that when speed is
important the project outline and a formal agreement can be ap
proved in a time period as short as one month.
The Panel deals with the question of what to train workers to do
by making the program almost entirely employer-driven. Employers
initiate the process by proposing individual projects to the Panel. If a
project is approved and a contract negotiated, the employer selects
trainees according to its own specifications, sets standards for suc
cessful program completion, and approves the training curriculum if
an outside training provider (e.g., a state post-secondary educational
institution) is selected. The Panel reimburses employers or other
training providers on a fixed-fee basis for the training costs incurred.
ETP funds may not be spent to subsidize the wages paid to trainees
or to pay income-maintenance allowances. Nor does ETP, as is typi
cal of state training programs, provide support for remedial educa
tion. In return for the training subsidy and the discretion given them
in all aspects of the retraining process, participating employers must
make a good-faith commitment to hire or retain program graduates.
Largely bypassed, therefore, is the problem that workers are trained
in skills that are no longer demanded by employers.
Two unique features of ETP are its funding mechanism and its
extensive use of performance-based contracting. With respect to
funding, state retraining programs are typically financed by general
state tax revenues. A widely discussed policy issue is whether fi
nancing options for displaced worker programs should be expanded
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to include the use of state UI trust funds (see, for example, Kuttner
1985). Federal law currently restricts the use of UI trust funds to
financing income-maintenance benefits. As noted in connection with
the New Jersey Demonstration in chapter 3, critics of the present UI
system argue that to facilitate the reemployment of displaced work
ers, the use of UI trust funds should be expanded to finance retrain
ing and other forms of adjustment assistance. In California, ETP is
linked to the state's UI trust fund by the statutory requirement that
the program is to operate so as to reduce UI expenditures by speed
ing up claimants' reemployment. To avoid the federal prohibition on
financing retraining programs with UI trust funds, a novel strategy
adopted by the California legislature was to create a separate Em
ployment Training Fund financed by a 0.1 percent payroll tax as
sessed on all employers with a positive reserve in their UI account.
At the same time, state employers had their regular UI tax rates re
duced by 0.1 percent. The funding of ETP can thus be viewed as a
diversion of a small part of regular UI tax revenues to finance train
ing and economic development. California was in a favorable posi
tion to carry out this diversion because of a surplus in its UI trust
fund. Since 1983, two states Delaware and Washington have fol
lowed California's example in diverting regular UI contributions to
separate training and economic development funds financed by an
employer payroll tax.
Turning to its contracting mechanism, ETP's enabling legislation
requires that all contracts between the Panel and employers or train
ing agencies be performance-based. Performance is defined strin
gently to mean that the negotiated payment per worker is withheld
until trainees have completed their retraining programs, are placed in
training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated in the contract, and are
retained in those jobs for at least 90 days. Moreover, the jobs for
which workers are trained must be good jobs in the sense that they
offer long-term employment security and career potential and pro
vide wages that are customary for the occupation and industry in the
local labor market in which employment is to occur. Thus Panel
funds are not spent until trainees have completed their training and
are satisfactorily placed.
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Table 4.2
ETP Program, June 30, 1988
the
Summary Statistics for
Post% of
Ave.
Ave.
training hours of planned expenditures
cost/
Clients served
1985
1988
wage training3
trainee
by the project
24
52
503
$6.68
$3,135
Unemployed
only
234
31
63
9.42
2,196
Potentially dis
placed only
17
13
333
7.57
2,273
Both groups
Sources: ETP (1985: table 4), ETP (1987: table III-D), and ETP (1988: table III-D).
"Data for June 30, 1987.

Evaluation Evidence
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for successful program grad
uates as reported in the most recent ETP annual report (1988) to the
legislature. As might be expected, upgrading the skills of current
employees potentially at risk of displacement is considerably cheaper
than retraining the unemployed. The average number of hours of
training for employed trainees is less than half that for unemployed
trainees, while the average post-training wage for employed trainees
is nearly $3.00 per hour higher than for the unemployed. It is also
interesting to note that as of 1988, 63 percent of ETP expenditures is
directed toward potentially displaced workers only, and another 13
percent of expenditures includes the potentially displaced as well as
actual unemployed workers. This is in contrast to earlier years, such
as 1985, in which over 50 percent of ETP expenditures went to
projects designed for the unemployed.
Estimates of the impact of ETP on participants' earnings are re
ported in a recent evaluation study carried out by the Training Re
search Corporation of Santa Monica, California (see Moore, Wilms,
and Bolus 1988). Analyzed are the records of about 3,900 individu
als enrolled in ETP training programs between 1983 and 1985.
About 60 percent of the trainees examined were unemployed and
seeking new jobs, while the other 40 percent had enrolled in retrain
ing to avoid layoffs. As shown in table 4.3, sampled participants are
further stratified by whether they completed their training program
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Table 4.3
Estimated Net Impact of the ETP Program on Annual Earnings
Initial employment
PrePost- Difference Regression
status and program
propro- (% change) coef. (stand.
gram gram
error)
completion status
Unemployed:
Completed, employed
$9,628 $16,912
$7,284
$3,745
90 days (N = 234)
(76)
(691)
Dropped out (N = 125)

9,017

9,882

865
(10)

-1,351
(684)

Completed, not employed 10,538
90 days (N = 96)

12,352

1,814
(17)

+

21,408

27,147

5,739
(27)

1,664
(1,136)

16,354

19,106

2,752
(17)

-867
(1,178)

Completed, not employed 14,108
90 days (N = 123)

20,466

6,358
(45)

+

Employed:
Completed, employed
90 days (N = 1,008)
Dropped out (N = 440)

Source: Moore, Wilms, and Bolus (1988: tables 9, 10, and 18).
Notes: Average annual earnings are shown in the first two columns + indicates the refer
ence group. .

and, if they had completed training, whether they stayed on the job
for 90 days. For the sample as a whole, participants were predomi
nantly male heads of households between the ages of 25 and 45.
Exactly one-half were white, with Hispanics representing another 25
percent and blacks 12 percent.
In the absence of a comparison or control group of nonparticipants, the Training Research Corporation evaluation relies mainly on
a pre-program/post-program comparison of labor market outcomes
supplemented by comparable information on program dropouts. As
discussed in chapter 2, a fundamental problem with this evaluation
approach is that the program effect will be overstated if the typical
pre-program dip in earnings is the result of some transitory labor

Does Training Work for Displaced Workers?

57

market phenomenon. Looking first at participants who were initially
unemployed, table 4.3 presents evidence of a rebound in average an
nual earnings for program dropouts; but the magnitude of the re
bound ($865 or 10 percent) is dwarfed by the 76 percent increase in
earnings enjoyed by program completers who stayed on the job for
90 days. Of course, this comparison is marred by the self selection
inherent in the unobserved process that somehow leads some partic
ipants to complete the program while others drop out. Holding con
stant a number of personal and program characteristics and previous
earnings, the regression results appearing in the last column show
that, relative to program completers who did not stay on the job for
90 days, completers who were retained enjoyed a statistically signif
icant increase in earnings of $3,745. On the other hand, dropping
out had a significantly negative earnings impact. Accepting these es
timates at face value, the estimated difference in earnings between
completing training and dropping out is thus $5,096 per year, or 53
percent expressed as a percentage of average pre-program earnings.
For employed program participants, the very fact that individuals
were working rather than unemployed prior to entering the program
means that (1) there should be less of a upward bias due to a tran
sitory pre-program dip in earnings, and (2) any observed pre
program/post-program earnings growth should capture to a greater
extent higher wages as opposed to more stable employment. 2 Re
flecting these considerations, the percentage growth in earnings is
seen in table 4.3 to be much smaller for initially employed program
completers (27 percent) than for initially unemployed completers (76
percent). Among the initially employed, nevertheless, earnings
growth for completers exceeds that for dropouts by 10 percentage
points. A rather surprising result is the 45 percent earnings growth
experienced by the relatively small number of program completers
who did not stay on the job for 90 days. Given their low average
pre-program earnings of just $14,108, it is quite possible that these
individuals went through the training program and then moved on to
better paying jobs with other employers. The regression results for
the initially employed again indicate sizable positive and negative
effects, respectively, of program completion and dropping out. In
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both cases, however, the estimates are accompanied by very large
standard errors indicating a wide range of possible effects among
individuals.

Criticisms of ETP
The two principal concerns that have been raised about the ETP
program relate to the selection of participants and the use of public
funds to subsidize training costs employers might otherwise have
borne. There is no question that adherence to a performance-based
system for compensating training providers increases the probability
that the displaced workers most likely to be selected into the pro
gram will be those least in need of skill enhancement. This problem
is commonly known as "creaming." One piece of evidence suggest
ing that creaming does in fact occur is the Panel's own finding noted
in its 1988 annual report that only 8 percent of Panel trainees had
failed to complete at least 12 years of schooling (see ETP 1988: ta
ble III-F). The same statistic for the state's labor force is 27 percent.
However, the report also points out that 53 percent of trainees are
women compared to a workforce that is 43 percent female. Blacks
and Hispanics are approximately proportionately represented among
ETP trainees.
Moreover, as pointed out in table 4.2, ETP increasingly appears to
be subsidizing the training by firms of their current workforces as
opposed to supplying training to unemployed workers. One reason,
as noted in the study by the Panel of Technology and Employment of
the National Academy of Sciences (see Cyert and Mowery 1987:
152), is that the requirement that trainees be placed in jobs for 90
days prior to reimbursement discourages many potential external
training providers such as community colleges from participating in
the program. A consequence of the increased retraining of the em
ployed is that ETP may be substituting public funds for the training
investments employers would have made themselves in the program's
absence. In this situation, there would be no net increase in the de
livery of training services to workers threatened with displacement.
On the assumption that large firms are better able to fund retraining
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than small firms, the following evidence taken from ETP's 1987 an
nual report on the size distribution of employers of program gradu
ates is instructive (see ETP 1987: table II-A):

Firm size

Panel trainees

Total state
employment

0-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-1000
1000+

18%
6
10
14
6
46

32%
11
15
10
9
23

Firm size in this table is measured by number of employees. It is
clear that ETP trainees are underrepresented in the workforces of
small employers and overrepresented in the workforces of quite large
employers.
In defense of the Panel, two points should be brought out. First,
the year 1987 marked an important transition for ETP in that, for the
first time, employers' demand for training assistance exceeded the
supply of available funds, forcing the rationing of funds among pro
spective contractors. This excess-demand situation has led the Panel
to impose certain priorities on its basic operating philosophy of re
sponding to the market demand for training. More specifically, the
list of new Panel priorities includes expedited consideration given to
proposals in which special employment opportunities are offered to
minorities, women, the disabled, and veterans and to proposals
which promise assistance to persons already laid off or in danger of
layoff due to plant closures or permanent mass layoffs. In addition,
the Panel has committed itself to targeting approximately 30 percent
of its funds for projects retraining the unemployed; and it is conduct
ing a special marketing outreach to small businesses and minorityand female-owned enterprises.
Second and more fundamentally, ETP should be properly viewed
as an economic development program to assist both employers and
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workers, as opposed to strictly a jobs program to assist disadvantaged workers. In this context, a major goal of the program is to
provide employers with an incentive to modernize plants and avoid
layoffs by subsidizing the costs of retraining existing employees.
Moreover, subsidies to large employers can be rationalized on the
grounds that these firms provide jobs that pay high wages and offer
career potential that is, the kinds of jobs that are mandated by
ETP's enabling legislation. From a political perspective, finally,
since employers of all sizes are contributing financially to ETP, the
assistance to large employers is important in maintaining overall
business support for the program.

Minnesota's MEED Program
Major Program Features
While not strictly a displaced worker program, the MEED wagesubsidy program has developed in such a way that it offers a useful
contrast to ETP as well as being of interest in its own right. MEED
was created in 1983 by a Minnesota state legislature faced with
double-digit unemployment rates coupled with a high percentage of
unemployed workers who had exhausted their UI eligibility. The leg
islature's response in MEED was a two-year program designed to
create temporary jobs in the public sector and permanent jobs in
the private sector. The program was initially funded at a hefty $70
million for the July 1983 to June 1985 biennium using general tax
revenues.
As originally conceived, MEED was fundamentally an emergency
job creation program, with at least 60 percent of the jobs created
expected to be in the public sector. The focus on public-sector job
creation was due to the legislature's initial skepticism about the will
ingness of private employers to participate in MEED. As the pro
gram evolved, however, greater than expected participation of
private employers led to a reversal in job placement objectives. By
the second year of the program, 60 percent of jobs were designated
to be in the private sector (a 70 percent private-sector placement rate
was actually achieved); and an additional $30 million was appropri-
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ated by the legislature. MEED was made a permanent program in
1985. Currently, a minimum of 75 percent of jobs created must be in
the private sector; and $27 million was appropriated for MEED in
the biennium ending June 30, 1987. 3 Temporary public-sector em
ployment is presently viewed as a method for allowing the most disadvantaged to acquire the work experience that will lead to eventual
private-sector MEED placement.
The private-sector component of MEED is a wage-subsidy pro
gram. The main features of the wage subsidy can be outlined as
follows:
1. Eligible job seekers are those who are unemployed and are in
eligible for or have exhausted either UI benefits or workers' compen
sation. Priority is given to applicants eligible for General Assistance
or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and to farm
families that can demonstrate severe financial need. MEED is there
fore available to assist displaced workers who have exhausted their
UI eligibility, but it is not restricted to only displaced workers.
2. MEED offers employers who hire targeted workers a subsidy
of up to $4 per hour in wages and up to $1 per hour in fringe ben
efits for a maximum of 1,040 hours over 26 weeks. The 26-week
period can be extended up to one year for workers undergoing job
training.
3. Participating employers are given a strong financial incentive
to retain targeted workers for at least 12 months beyond the 6
months of subsidized employment. If an employee is not retained on
the job beyond the initial 6 months, the employer is required to re
pay 70 percent of the amount received under the program. No repay
ment is expected, on the other hand, if targeted workers are retained
one year or longer beyond the subsidy period. A prorated portion of
the subsidy must be repaid for employees retained less than one year.
4. Small businesses are given priority for MEED participation.
The MEED annual report covering the July 1985 to December
1986 period indicates that 85 percent of private-sector participants
were employed in unsubsidized jobs at the time of a 60-day followup survey after the completion of the subsidy period (see Minnesota
Department of Jobs and Training 1987). Of workers in unsubsidized
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jobs, nearly 91 percent continued to be employed by the same firm,
while about 9 percent changed employers following the subsidy pe
riod. Average unsubsidized hourly wages for the two groups were
$5.37 and $6.06, respectively. Most individuals employed under
MEED qualify for the full subsidy over 26 weeks. Hence, average
program cost per worker is relatively high at approximately $4,680.
Contrasts with ETP
Beyond the difference in economic conditions existing at their cre
ation, the MEED program contrasts strongly with California's ETP in
three additional respects. One contrast is in underlying philosophies.
ETP's philosophy is that updated skills are a prerequisite for workers
to obtain or retain jobs. Thus payments made to employers are viewed
as reimbursement for training expenses incurred. In contrast, the ex
plicit philosophy of MEED is that job seekers need employment, not
retraining. If jobs are available, workers will be found to fill them.
From this perspective, wage subsidies are primarily viewed as a job
creation device. Nevertheless, MEED-funded jobs do appear in many
cases to offer training opportunities. A 1985 survey (see Rangan
1985) carried out by a coalition of state organizations, the Jobs Now
Coalition, indicates that over 77 percent of participating private em
ployers provided an affirmative answer to the question, "Did you
provide any special training on- or off-the-job?"
A second difference between the two programs concerns the char
acteristics of workers likely to receive assistance. The earlier discus
sion of ETP outlined the incentive for training providers to cream in
the trainee-selection process. MEED, on the other hand, targets the
wage-subsidy to members of specific disadvantaged groups. A more
recent 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) indicates, in
fact, that MEED placements are disproportionately held by public
assistance eligibles, women, and minorities. In particular, 54 percent
of its placements during the 1985-87 biennium were public assis
tance eligible, 42 percent were women, and 25 percent were minor
ities (in a state with a total minority population of only 4 to 5
percent). MEED is also increasingly directing its job placement
activity to the balance of the state (i.e., counties outside the
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Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area) where unemployment is dis
proportionately concentrated.
A final contrast deals with the mix of participating employers. As
noted, relatively large California employers are more likely than
smaller employers to participate in ETP. In line with MEED's legis
lative priorities, on the other hand, small Minnesota employers are
heavily involved in the program. In its 1987 survey, the Jobs Now
Coalition reports the following information on the size distribution
of participating employers (see Rode 1988: table 5):
Firm size
5 or less
6-20
21-50
51-99
100 or more

Participating firms
51.2%
29.9
9.7
4.8
4.3

where firm size is measured by number of full-time employees. The
really dramatic feature of these data is the heavy involvement of
very small, start-up firms and the almost total noninvolvement of
larger employers defined as firms with 100 or more workers. As
large firms are known to pay higher wages on average than smaller
firms (see, for example, Brown and Medoff 1989), the MEED wagesubsidy represents an especially large cut in labor costs to smaller
employers. But even given this economic incentive favoring partici
pation by small employers, it is interesting to note that the MEED
experience runs counter to the usual finding that participation in em
ployment subsidy programs is directly related to firm size. Using a
USDOL survey of nearly 6,000 employers, Bishop and Montgomery
(1986) report that both knowledge of and participation in the four
targeted employment subsidy programs in operation in 1980 (the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, the WIN tax credit, and the CETA and
WIN on-the-job-training programs) are strongly and positively corre
lated with establishment size. The authors note, however, that the
participation rates of employers, even for those knowledgeable about
the programs, are very low.
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The Dayton Wage-Subsidy Experiment
It is also interesting to contrast the MEED wage-subsidy program
with the results of a federally funded controlled experiment carried
out in Dayton, Ohio during 1980-81. As described by Burtless (1985),
the purpose of the experiment was to test the effectiveness of a tar
geted wage-subsidy program in increasing the labor market success
of disadvantaged workers defined as General Assistance and AFDC
recipients. General Assistance eligibles were typically young men
and women who were members of one- or two-person families in
which no dependent children were present. Many were temporarily
destitute. AFDC recipients were largely single women in their twen
ties responsible for the support of one or more dependent children.
Individuals targeted by the Dayton program were randomly as
signed to either of two treatment groups or to a control group. The
first treatment group received vouchers that entitled their employers,
upon making a hiring commitment, to a tax credit equal to 50 per
cent of earnings paid during the first year of employment and 25
percent of second-year earnings. The main goal of this treatment was
to inform employers of clients' eligibility for tax credits under the
then-existing Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and WIN tax credit programs.
Rather than a tax credit, the vouchers received by members of the
second treatment group authorized their employers to receive direct
cash payments equal to the same percentages of the first- and
second-year earnings. The difference between the two treatments is
that for employers owing no federal income taxes, the tax credit
vouchers were valueless, whereas the direct rebate subsidies would
probably be worth claiming. Subsidy limits for both treatment
groups were $3,000 and $1,500, respectively, for the first two years
of employment. Members of the treatment groups and the control
group received two weeks of job search training, which were fol
lowed by six weeks of structured job search. The vouchers expired at
the end of the six-week job search period.
The results of the experiment are shown in table 4.4. For the two
treatment groups, only 13.0 percent of the tax credit group and 12.7
percent of the direct cash payment group found employment during
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Table 4.4
Job Placement Rates in the Dayton Targeted
Wage-Subsidy Experiment
No. placed
No. enrolled
in jobs
Group
247
Tax credit voucher
32
299
Direct rebate voucher
38
262
54
Control

65

Placement
rate
13.0%
12.7
20.6

Source: Burtless (1985: table 1).

the eight weeks of the experiment. Thus the direct cash payments
did not increase labor market success relative to the tax credits.
More important, the placement rates of both treatment groups were
lower than the 20.6 percent rate obtained by the control group.
Rather than improving the employment prospects of targeted work
ers, it appears that the primary use of the vouchers by Dayton em
ployers was as a labor market signal of potentially poor job
performance. This explanation would account for both the lower
placement rates observed for the treatment groups and the failure of
the different subsidy payment mechanisms to make a difference. The
disquieting implication of the experiment for wage-subsidy policies
is that vouchers appear to have a stigmatizing effect in the sense that
rather than easing the placement of target groups, the vouchers pro
vide information which employers used to discriminate against the
disadvantaged.
It is also of interest to note that of the 70 voucher holders who
found employment, only 19, or little more than one-quarter, were
employed by firms that requested certification for payment of the
wage-subsidy. Burtless speculates that the 73 percent of employers
who did not request payment may have considered the subsidies too
small to justify the expense of filing for them. On the other hand,
participants who succeeded in finding jobs may have refrained from
telling employers that they were covered by a wage-subsidy pro
gram, reasoning (correctly) that the information conveyed by the
voucher would not increase their chance of finding employment.
O'Neill (1982) also observes that the low utilization rates for sub-
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sidy programs that are narrowly targeted to particular socioeconomic
groups may occur because targeted individuals who apply for jobs
choose not to reveal to potential employers their membership in a
target group.

Assessing MEED's Impact
Burtless's evaluation of the Dayton experiment and the historically
low take-up rates for targeted wage-subsidies leave little room for
optimism regarding the potential of these programs. MEED's record
to date leads to a more positive conclusion. In particular, MEED
appears to have been enthusiastically received by Minnesota employ
ers, particularly small and relatively new businesses, despite the pri
ority given to hiring hard-to-employ target groups. This is indicated
by the shift in the program's emphasis toward private-sector job cre
ation, its continued funding during the economic recovery following
the 1981-82 recession, and surveys describing a high degree of em
ployer satisfaction with MEED.
The reasons for the difference in employers' reactions to the Day
ton and MEED programs can only be speculated upon. Nevertheless,
it is clear that MEED officials, like those of California's ETP pro
gram, recognize that it is critical to retain the support of the business
community. From this perspective, the following considerations may
play a role in MEED's comparative success.
1. MEED is promoted as a program to assist Minnesota's small
businesses to grow and diversify. That is, MEED is sold as an eco
nomic development tool rather than as a government program to as
sist the unemployed and disadvantaged. In this connection, the 1987
Jobs Now Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) points out that 81 per
cent of surveyed employers responded affirmatively to a question
that asked whether MEED enabled them to expand their production
or scale of operations, 60 percent noted that the wage subsidy made
it possible for them to invest in new capital equipment, and 54 per
cent stated that MEED made it possible to diversify into new areas.
Among firms that reported expansion of their workforces, 56 percent
indicated that they would not have been able to create new jobs
without MEED assistance, and another 4 percent suggested that their
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expansion would have been delayed without the program. A further
breakdown of these data suggests that MEED assistance is particu
larly beneficial to the growth of very small and new businesses. The
same survey indicates, finally, that 86 percent of responding employ
ers stated that they were "very satisfied" with their MEED employ
ees, and only 23 percent mentioned that the subsidy failed to
improve the performance of their business.
2. MEED officials have taken pains to keep their rules simple and
administrative overhead low. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey
reports that 92 percent of responding employers felt that they were
able to fill their jobs with a minimum of red tape, and 94 percent
stated that they found the rules easy to understand. Both of these
considerations are consistent with the policy conclusion reached by
Bishop and Montgomery (1986) that the rate of employer usage of
employment subsidy programs can be increased by vigorous promo
tion by local administrators and by keeping the costs of participation
as low as possible.
Most state-funded training programs are like the ETP program in
imposing few constraints on employers in their selection of trainees.
The MEED program demonstrates that it is possible to walk the fine
line between targeting assistance to particular groups of disadvantaged workers while at the same time enjoying widespread business
support.
Summary
Although state-funded retraining initiatives are in operation in vir
tually every state, state legislators have generally not opted to devote
scarce resources to funding quantitative program evaluation analyses.
One of the few exceptions to this statement is the evaluation of Cal
ifornia's ETP program described in this chapter, and even this eval
uation is flawed by the absence of a comparison group of
nonparticipants. The general unavailability of evaluation evidence
severely limits the information that state programs can provide on
the first three of the four research question posed in chapter 1,
namely, the issues of whether some types of training work better
than others, whether some groups of workers benefit more from
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training than others, and whether effective training programs operate
by increasing wages rates as well as by accelerating reemployment.
Fortunately, however, the design of various state programs provides
considerable insight into the fourth research question of what to train
workers to do.
State-funded retraining programs are typically more tailored to
meet the needs of individuals employers than federal programs, and
this chapter focused attention on employer involvement in the ETP
program and the program's stringent performance standards. Califor
nia employers are encouraged to propose individual retraining
projects for ETP funding. If a project is approved and a contract
negotiated, the employer selects trainees according to its own speci
fication, sets standards for successful program completion, and ap
proves the training curriculum if an outside training provider is used.
ETP's performance standards permit training providers to be reim
bursed for training expenses only for those trainees who successfully
complete the program and are placed in training-related jobs at stip
ulated wages and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
Allowing employers to participate in trainee selection and the use
of performance-based contracting clearly should contribute to strong
program performance in terms of job placement, and the preliminary
pre-program/post-program evaluation of ETP indicates a sizable pro
gram effect on annual earnings. Nevertheless, downside factors as
sociated with the ETP approach are an increased likelihood that
training providers will select those eligible workers least in need of
retraining and the strong incentive given employers to retrain current
employees, as opposed to offering training to unemployed workers.
In this context, the design and operation of Minnesota's MEED
targeted wage-subsidy program is instructive. Despite an absence of
quantitative evaluation evidence, available qualitative measures of
program success for MEED suggest that it is possible to target assis
tance to the hard-to-employ and still enjoy widespread business sup
port, especially the support of small businessmen. In particular,
Minnesota program officials appear to have successfully overcome
the stigma associated by employers with program vouchers in the
federally funded Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment.
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NOTES
1. More information on the broad range of proposed and ongoing state initiatives to assist
displaced workers is found in Leigh (1989). In addition to vocational training and job search
assistance, these initiatives include wage subsidies, reemployment bonuses, rapid-response
team programs, enterprise zones, employee buy-one assistance, and unemployed entrepreneur
programs.
2. Moore, Wilms, and Bolus (1988: tables 11 and 12) report for initially unemployed training
completers that the average annual number of weeks unemployed fell from 6.2 weeks before
training to 2.7 weeks after training. For initially employed training completers, the comparable
change is from 2.4 weeks before training to 1.2 weeks after training.
3. MEED was appropriated $18 million for the July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1988 fiscal year.
Indicating a possible phasing out of the program, just $4 million has been appropriated for
July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1990.

5
Canadian Training Programs

For over 60 years, the Canadian government has provided unem
ployed workers with employment information and job placement ser
vices delivered through a joint federal-provincial network of Canada
Employment Centres. With the passage of the Adult Occupational
Training (AOT) Act in 1966, the federal government initiated, in ad
dition, a series of training programs intended to improve the reemployment prospects of adult workers. AOT programs included the
purchase of classroom training from community colleges and other
training institutions under the Canadian Manpower Training Program
(CMTP) and on-the-job training purchased from private-sector em
ployers under the Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program
(CMITP).
Following a critical evaluation of these programs in 1981 (the
"Dodge Report"), the AOT Act was replaced by the National Train
ing Act (NTA) passed in 1982. While continuing the earlier legisla
tion's emphasis on increasing the earnings and employment potential
of individual workers, the central objective of the NTA was to pro
vide vocational training in order to better meet the skill requirements
of a changing Canadian economy. Major component programs of the
NTA were (1) the National Institutional Training Program, which
continued the CMTP's focus on formal classroom training, (2) the
National Industrial Training Program, which emphasized OJT, and
(3) the Skills Growth Fund, which was intended to expand the ca
pacity of the Canadian economy to train workers for jobs in shortage
occupations. The National Institutional Training Program was by far
the largest of the three NTA programs.
During the fall of 1984, a change in administrations at the federal
level resulted in a comprehensive review of all federal labor market
policies. The outcome of this review was the establishment in 1985
of an umbrella program called the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CIS).
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This chapter begins with a brief overview of the component pro
grams of the CIS that relate to adjustment problems faced by dis
placed workers. This section is followed by discussions of two major
quantitative evaluations of Canadian displaced worker programs.
Considered first is a 1985 evaluation, carried out by Abt Associates
of Canada, of CT programs funded by the National Institutional
Training Program. Then the results of a 1981 evaluation of CMITPfunded OJT programs are examined. This second evaluation was
conducted by the Program Evaluation Branch of Employment and
Immigration Canada (EIC). Also briefly discussed in connection
with the CMITP evaluation are results from an evaluation of the
Youth Training Option program.

The Canadian Jobs Strategy
As summarized in table 5.1, the CIS consists of six component
programs each of which is designed to meet the adjustment assis
tance needs of a particular client group workers, employers, or
communities. Like the state-funded programs discussed in chapter 4,
CIS retraining assistance is available to employed workers at risk of
being laid off if their skills are not upgraded, as well as to already
unemployed workers. In addition, CIS programs emphasize involve
ment by private-sector employers at the local level. The three CIS
programs that appear to be most relevant to the needs of Canadian
displaced workers are Job Development, Skill Investment, and Com
munity Futures. 1
Job Development
This CIS program is designed to provide training and practical
work experience for the long-term unemployed defined as individu
als out of work 24 of the last 30 weeks who are referred to the
program through a Canada Employment Centre. Funding both class
room training and on-the-job training, the Job Development program
is seen in table 5.1 to be the largest of the six programs in terms of
1986-87 expenditures and number of participants. Job Development
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Table 5.1
_____Component Programs of the Canadian Jobs Strategy______
1986-87
1986-87
expenditures participants
Program
name___________Description_____($millions)___(OOOs)
70.9
182.2
Provides subsidies to emSkill Shortages
ployers that train workers
in high-demand skills
that may be in short sup
ply41.2

17.8

Assists youth in making
the transition from school
to work and women hav
ing difficulty re-entering
the labor market after an
absence from the work
force.

402.9

149.0

Job Development Assists the reemployment
of the long-term unem
ployed.

768.7

176.2

Community
Futures

Assists single-industry
communities hit by plant
closings and mass lay
offs.

63.5

3.1

Innovations

14.8
Funds pilot projects and
demonstration projects.________

Skill Investment

Assists experienced
workers to retain their
jobs by updating their
skills. Five options are
available.

Job Entry

Source: EIC (1988: 48-49 and 64-65).

training takes place in two forms. First, employers are assisted in
developing projects that create three or more jobs lasting between 16
and 52 weeks. Second, for the long-term unemployed who have par
ticular employment disadvantages due to social or cultural barriers,
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assistance is provided to employers who develop individual-specific
training slots lasting up to 52 weeks. Employers participating in
either Job Development component are eligible to receive (1) up to
60 percent of wages paid subject to a cap of $7.50 per hour with a
weekly maximum of $300 per participant (up to 100 percent of
wages for nonprofit employers), (2) up to $8 per participant training
hour to cover the direct costs of CT provided either on-site or off-site
at a community college or another recognized training institution,
and (3) payment to cover the salaries received by administrative
staff. In addition, employers who purchase special equipment or
make structural renovations to the workplace to accommodate phys
ically disabled employees can receive up to $10,000 per participant
to defray these costs.

Skill Investment
Rather than waiting to intervene until after workers have been laid
off, the Skill Investment program is designed to provide classroom
and on-the-job training to enable experienced workers to retain their
jobs through skill upgrading. Client groups are presented with five
options. First, the Retraining option helps to pay wages and training
costs for small businesses faced with rapid technological and market
change. (Small businesses are defined as firms with less than 100
employees.) Employers providing OJT are eligible to receive a wage
subsidy of up to 60 percent of wages subject to ceilings per worker
of $7.50 per hour and $300 per week. For providing CT opportuni
ties, employers are eligible to receive up to $20 per hour for each
participant training hour. The minimum length of training is 80
hours, and agreements with the Skill Investment program can last up
to three years. Special funds are also available to defray the costs of
assisting the physically disabled.
The Continuing Employment option is directed to workers who
are in danger of losing or who have lost their jobs within the past
four months because of market or technological change. Current
and new employers who employ participating workers are eligible
to receive the same financial support as that provided under the Re
training option. For the same target group of workers, a third op-
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tion Relocation and Travel Assistance offers up to $5,000 to
meet the relocation and travel assistance requirements of program
participants.
The fourth option Work Sharing attempts to avert temporary
layoffs and to cushion the impact of permanent layoffs by providing
partial compensation for the reduced earnings that accompany a
shorter workweek. Under this voluntary program, employers con
tinue to pay for regular hours worked, but participating workers re
ceive UI benefits for time not worked up to a total of three days per
week. These Work Sharing days may be used for training, with em
ployers reimbursed for a major portion of direct training costs. Work
Sharing agreements are normally expected to be in effect for 6 to
26 weeks.
Finally, the Training Trust Fund option encourages unions and em
ployee associations to combine with employers in establishing trust
funds intended to finance workers' future training needs. Under
agreements that can last up to three years, the Canadian federal gov
ernment will supplement the trust funds by 50 percent of total con
tributions in the first year and 33'/3 percent of total contributions in
the second and third years. A similar concept proposed but not yet
implemented in this country is the Individual Training Accounts
(ITA) proposal. As described by the Office of Technology Assess
ment (1986: 265-67), the basic idea underlying the ITA concept is
the establishment of a fund privately financed by workers, employ
ers, or both workers and employers that can be drawn upon to pay
for additional educational or training investments. Workers who have
lost their jobs or received notice of layoff would be eligible to with
draw funds from their training accounts to assist them in making
necessary transitions to new jobs or careers.

Community Futures
Instead of targeting on either workers or employers, this CIS pro
gram is designed to assist nonmetropolitan, often one-industry com
munities that have been hard hit by a plant closing or mass
permanent layoff. The program revolves around Community Futures
Committees composed of local workers, employers, and government
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officials. Once established, these committees can choose from
among the following options offered under the program:
1. Business Development Centres, which provide technical and
advisory services to small businesses as well as loans of up to
$75,000 per firm.
2. Income-maintenance support of $180 per week for one year to
enable unemployed workers to start their own small businesses. 2
3. Assistance to employed, self-employed, and unemployed indi
viduals to cover the direct costs of classroom training in approved
training institutions.
4. Relocation and travel assistance to enable individuals or groups
of workers to move to jobs elsewhere.
5. Community Initiative Funds, which will match funds obtained
from other sources to finance local projects designed to generate new
permanent jobs. These options are available to Community Futures
Committees for up to five years.
Beyond the component programs of the CIS, an interesting policy
change announced by the EIC in April 1989 is the creation of a new
plan, the Labour Force Development Strategy, to change the allocation
of Canadian UI expenditures. As in the U.S., the traditional role of
Canada's UI program is the essentially passive one of providing tem
porary income support to individuals who are involuntarily out of
work. A very small percentage of total UI expenditures has been de
voted to training and upgrading workers' skills. Beginning in 1990,
the new plan calls for 10 percent of the UI program's total expendi
tures (or $1.3 billion) to be redirected to a more active response to
the needs of the unemployed. Some $800 million of this amount will
be allocated to upgrading job skills; and about $500 million will go
to improving UI benefits for maternity, sickness, and parental leave,
as well as for workers over the age of 65 (EIC: 1989).
The NITP Evaluation
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the National Institu
tional Training Program (NITP) was created in 1982 to fund CT slots
in specific vocational courses offered by public and private voca
tional centers, technical institutes, and community colleges. Chan-
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neling training purchases primarily through the individual provinces,
training courses supported by the NITP were generally under 52
weeks in length and did not lead to a diploma or degree. Also funded,
in addition to the direct costs of training, was income-maintenance
support for trainees. Canadian Employment Centres were given the
task of enrolling and referring candidates to the program.
The NITP included the following component programs: (1) Skill
Training, (2) Language Training, (3) Basic Training for Skill Devel
opment (BTSD), (4) Apprenticeship Training, (5) Job Readiness
Training, (6) Work Adjustment Training, and (7) Occupational Ori
entation. BTSD courses were designed to upgrade basic skills in
mathematics and communications so that participants could meet the
academic requirements for entry into the Skill Training program or to
proceed on to employment. 3 Skill Training courses were designed
either to provide entry-level skills in a particular occupation or to
upgrade or update the occupation-specific skills a worker already
possessed. The 1985 program evaluation reported in Robinson et al.
(1985) examines specifically the Skill Training and BTSD programs.
NITP is thus unique among the projects and programs examined in
this study in that net impact estimates are available for a remedial
education program. For both NITP programs analyzed, the twofold
objective of the evaluation is (1) to determine the impact of institu
tional training on the employability and earnings of trainees, and (2)
to examine the impact of institutional training on meeting the skill
needs of the economy.
An interesting feature of the NITP evaluation is that it provides a
comparison of program impact estimates obtained using pre- and
post-training data on labor market outcomes for participants with
program impacts estimated using a comparison sample of nonparticipants. The participant sample includes about 1,500 Skill Training
trainees and about 500 BTSD trainees who finished training courses
in 1983-84. About 30 percent of all Skill trainees were women,
while nearly half of all BTSD trainees were female. For both pro
grams, more than three-quarters of all trainees were unemployed
prior to training, and most trainees were in the 20-44 age bracket.
Pre-program data for the sample of participants were obtained from

78

Canadian Training Programs

administrative records, and a follow-up telephone survey conducted
12 months after the completion of training provided post-training in
formation.
Construction of the comparison samples began with the drawing
of 2,000 nonparticipants matched to the characteristics of individu
als in the Skill Training and BTSD participant samples. Matching
criteria used in drawing the comparison samples include age, sex,
province, years in the labor force, proportion of time employed and
gross earnings in the year before training, and proportion of time
employed and average annual gross earnings, 1972 to training start.
The next step was to obtain addresses or telephone numbers so that
the follow-up survey could be administered. Difficulties in making
contact with many of the matched nonparticipants resulted in quite
small comparison groups numbering just 55 individuals for the
BTSC program and 165 individuals for the Skill Training program.
The small size of the comparison samples relative to the size of the
participant samples decreases the efficiency of the net impact esti
mates provided in the Robinson et al. report.
Beginning with the empirical results for the Skill Training pro
gram, the top half of table 5.2 indicates that in comparison to pre
program levels, participants' annual earnings and time employed as
a fraction of time in the labor force increased substantially. The per
centage increases in these two outcome measures are roughly offset
ting, so that the rise in average weekly earnings expressed as a
percentage of pre-program earnings is a moderate 5.3 percent. Both
earnings variables are deflated to 1981 dollars to abstract from the
effect of inflation. For the comparison group of nonparticipants, siz
able increases in the employment ratio and in annual earnings are
also observed, reflecting Canada's strong recovery from its worst
postwar recession in 1981-82. While the observed employment and
earnings gains for nonparticipants are not as large as for partici
pants, the percentage increase in weekly wages of 7.7 percent is
slightly higher.
The regression coefficient estimates shown in the last column of
the table measure program impacts after netting out improvements in
the outcome measures that occurred for nonparticipants and control-

Table 5.2
Net Impact Estimates for the NITP, Skill Training and BTSD Programs

Comparison Group

Participants
Year
before
training

Year
before
training

Posttraining

Difference
(% change)

Time employed/time
inLF
Time employed/
calendar time
Ave. weekly wage

41%

66%

Skill Training
54%
25%
(61.0)

$262

$276

Annual earnings

$6,573

$10,195

Time employed/time
inLF
Time employed/
calendar time
Ave. weekly wage

26%

54%

$178

$209

Annual earnings

$3,912

$6,590

Outcome measure

$14
(5.3)
$3,622
(55.1)

Posttraining

Difference
(% change)

65%

11%
(20.4)

$299

$322

$7,248

$9,947

55%

65%

$23
(7.7)
$2,699
(37.2)

Regression
coef.
(t-statistic)
-0.27
(-1.88)
0.31
(2.07)
-17.87
(-1.09)
762.98
(1.10)

BTSD
28%
(107.7)
$31
(17.4)
$2,678
(68.5)

$305

$302

$6,460

$9,350

10%
(18.2)
-$3
(-1.0)
$2,890
(44.7)

0.80
(-4.00)
-0.38
(-1.96)
-49.27
(-3.24)
-1,408.57
(-2.05)

Source: For Skill Training, Robinson et al. (1985: exhibits V-14 through V-18). For BTSD, Robinson et al. (1985: exhibits V-19 through V-23).
Note: Weekly wages and annual earnings are converted to 1981 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
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ling for the effects of a number of personal characteristics and pretraining labor market variables. No attempt was made to control for
self-selection bias. The regression results show that Skill Training
fails to have a statistically significant effect on either earnings mea
sure, while program participation does appear to increase the
employment-to-calendar-time ratio but to decrease the employmentto-labor-force-time ratio. The suggestion is that program participa
tion increases the extent of labor force participation. In total, these
discouraging results for the Skill Training program reinforce the sim
ilar findings obtained for classroom training programs in the U.S.
demonstration projects.
The interpretation of comparable empirical results for BTSD train
ees is clouded by the fact that the BTSD program was not necessar
ily intended to prepare workers for immediate employment and the
small size of the comparison sample. Despite these caveats, the pre
program/post-training comparisons shown in the lower half of table
5.2 indicate even larger percentage increases for BTSD trainees in
each of the three outcome measures than those reported for Skill
Training participants. The percentage increases for BTSD trainees
are also considerably larger than those for the comparison sample.
Nevertheless, the results of the regression analysis suggest that
BTSD training significantly decreases weekly and annual earnings as
well as both employment measures. It should be noted from the table
that the wages and annual earnings of nonparticipants are on average
much higher than the wages and annual earnings of BTSD trainees
in both the pre-training and post-training periods. Despite the at
tempt to match members of the comparison group to sample mem
bers, it appears that in addition to its small size, the comparison
group contains relatively few individuals with characteristics like
those of BTSD trainees.
In view of the NITP's objective of meeting the skill requirements
of the Canadian economy, it is also interesting to briefly review the
analysis of the occupational distribution of training provided in the
Abt Associates report. The analysis is limited to only Skill Training
participants; and the three indicators of skill shortages applied in the
analysis are (1) occupations in short supply as determined by the
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EIC's Program Evaluation Branch, (2) occupations considered to be
of national importance, and (3) occupations with the highest ex
pected growth rates. The evidence presented is mixed. With respect
to the first indicator, fewer than 11 percent of trainees were in
courses supplying training in what are classified as shortage occupa
tions. Conversely, about 65 percent of trainees were trained in "sur
plus" occupations. As measured by the other two indicators,
however, there appears to be a substantial degree of targeting to
shortage occupations. One further, but related, point of interest is
that the Abt Associates analysis of data on the occupation of posttraining employment indicates that the fraction of trainees who actu
ally used their training on the job is quite low.

The CMITP Evaluation
In contrast to the NITP's emphasis on formal classroom training
provided through Canada's educational infrastructure, the purpose of
the earlier Canadian Manpower Industrial Training Program
(CMITP) was to encourage employers to provide skill training
(termed "industrial" training) either in a classroom setting or on the
job. Eligible employers were reimbursed, either in whole or in part,
for the direct training expenses incurred and for a fraction of train
ees' wages. Since OJT was by far the more important source of
training, however,4 the CMITP was basically a wage-subsidy pro
gram with the level of the wage-subsidy hinging on the pre-program
employment status of the trainee. Maximum subsidies were 40 per
cent, 60 percent, and 85 percent, respectively, for employed, unem
ployed, and special needs trainees. (Special needs trainees include
persons who are physically or mentally handicapped, natives, or un
able to find work due to social barriers such as alcoholism or police
records.)
The Net Impact Analysis
The internal evaluation carried out by the Program Evaluation
Branch of the EIC (1981) uses pre- and post-program data on the
approximately 83,000 individuals trained during the 1978-79 period.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of Pre- and Post-Program Weekly Wages for the CMITP
Program completion
status and
trainee category_____Pre-program
Post-program
% change
Program completers:
$322
25.8
Employed
$256
Unemployed
164
234
42.7
200
40.8
Special needs
142
Dropouts:
46.6
189
277
Employed
236
41.3
Unemployed
167
144
211
46.5
Special needs
Source: EIC (1981: table 5.2).

Employed trainees represented the largest group of trainees (48 per
cent) and special needs trainees the smallest (8 percent). About 72
percent of all trainees were men. Relative to the sample of NITP
participants, the most noticeable characteristic of CMITP trainees is
their youth. Fully 51 percent of all trainees fell into the 14-24 age
bracket. Administrative records provided pre-program information
for the 12 months prior to training, and a 12-month follow-up survey
was used to supply post-program data. The training programs them
selves varied in length by trainee category. Special needs trainees
received, on average, the longest training (674 hours), followed in
order by unemployed trainees (586 hours) and employed trainees
(319 hours). Over half of the employed trainees were enrolled in
short duration training of less than 160 hours.
In the absence of an externally selected comparison group, the
only available evaluation methodology for the CMITP is a pre
program/post-program comparison of average weekly wages for pro
gram completers and dropouts. Data reported in the EIC evaluation
on average hours worked per week indicates very little change before
and after training, making it reasonable to treat growth in weekly
earnings as gains in hourly wage rates. The percentage changes
shown in table 5.3 for program completers indicate that both initially
unemployed and special need trainees benefited from the program to
a greater extent than did initially employed trainees. As compared to
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program dropouts, however, there is no evidence for any of the three
trainee categories that program completion had a positive payoff ex
pressed in terms of wage gains. Taken at face value, this result sup
ports a similar finding obtained for OJT in the Buffalo Dislocated
Worker Demonstration Project (see chapter 3). It should be empha
sized, however, that the decision to drop out is not exogenously de
termined, so there is good reason to expect that the effect of
program completion may be understated. For example, it might be
the case that trainees with above-average levels of ability are able to
cut short their training program by locating a high-paying job with
an alternative employer, thus biasing downward the measured effect
of training.

Data on Participating Employers
The EIC evaluation also provides data on participating employers
collected in a separate follow-up survey. Panel A of table 5.4 indi
cates that very small firms (i.e., those employing less than 10 work
ers) trained about 46 percent of both unemployed and special needs
trainees as opposed to just 16 percent of employed trainees. On the
other hand, firms in the two largest size categories (100-499 em
ployees and 500 and more employees) trained nearly 60 percent of
employed participants but only 19 percent and 12 percent, respec
tively, of unemployed and special needs trainees. These results par
allel the findings discussed in chapter 4 for the California ETP and
Minnesota MEED initiatives that large employers are disproportion
ately likely to participate in programs providing training to existing
employees, while very small employers have a greater propensity to
participate in programs directed at unemployed workers.
Panel B of table 5.4 provides a limited amount of information on
the issue raised in chapter 4 of whether government-sponsored re
training programs generate a net increase in the delivery of training
services. In exploring this issue, the EIC employer follow-up survey
posed several questions including the three reported in the table. The
three questions were worded as follows:
Without the financial support of the program it would
have been impossible for your firm to provide this training.
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Excluding this industrial training contract, has your firm
provided training to its employees before?
In the absence of the CMITP, what alternative course of
action would your firm have followed to acquire qualified
workers in the training occupation? [Seven possible re
sponses followed, and the respondent for each employer
was to check only the single most important one.]
Employers' answers to the first two questions indicate that the net
impact of CMITP on training opportunities depends strongly on firm
size. Large firms of 500 or more employees were quite likely to have
an ongoing training program, and only about one-quarter of these
firms stated that the financial assistance of the program was neces
sary for them to supply training to employees. At the other extreme,
fully 28 percent of very small firms had no experience providing
training services before CMITP, and 65 percent of these firms re
ported that government financial assistance was essential for imple
menting a training program.
The interpretation of responses to the final question asking about
employer training behavior in the absence of the CMITP is compli
cated by the availability of financial assistance to employers who are
retraining existing employees as well as to employers hiring and
training new employees. Of the four response options shown, the two
that relate to employers responding to the program by expanding the
level of their operations are the easiest to interpret and, at the same
time, reinforce the impression that the CMITP has the largest net
impact for small firms. Table 5.4 indicates that over 46 percent of
firms in the largest size category stated that they would have pro
vided the same hours of training to the same number of employees in
the absence of the program, while only 23 percent of the very small
firms reported that their behavior would have been unchanged in this
way. Conversely, only 5 percent of the largest firms stated that they
would not have hired and trained new workers in the program's ab
sence, in contrast to 26 percent of very small firms.
Using the employer survey data, Simpson (1984) presents an
econometric analysis which sheds some additional light on employ
ers' willingness to supply industrial training and on the nature of that
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Table 5.4
Effect of the CMITP on Training Opportunities,
by Size of Training Employer____________
Employer size (in number of employees)
1-9
10-49 50-99 100-499 500 +
A. Distribution of Trainees

Employed
Unemployed
Special needs

15.8%
45.9
46.4

18.1%
28.4
33.6

7.8%
7.0
7.9

23.5%
10.5
6.2

34.8%
8.2
5.9

B. Net Impact on Training
Financial aid was essen
tial to provide training
Employer never provided
training before
In the absence of the pro
gram the employer
would3
Have provided the
same training to the same
no. of employees
Have provided fewer

65.4

58.5

53.5

42.0

24.5

28.4

15.4

10.4

10.7

8.3

23.0

23.9

26.0

29.5

46.4

26.4

28.9

34.7

30.8

27.4

25.7

22.4

16.4

14.0

5.3

19.0

18.5

19.4

15.1

12.0

hours of training or

trained fewer workers
Not have expanded
employment and training
opportunities
Have hired an already
qualified employee

Source: EIC (1981: tables 3.3 and 7.7 and appendix tables E.I and E.2).
"Columns do not sum vertically to 100 percent because of the omission of an open-ended
"other" response and of the response that the absence of the program would have no effect on
training, recruiting qualified workers, or level of the firm's operation.

training. His key results are summarized in table 5.5, where estab
lishment size is measured by gross revenue in millions of dollars,
and CMITP assistance is captured by a dummy variable measuring
whether or not the employer accepted the government wage-subsidy.
The dependent variable is duration in months of industrial nonapprenticeship training programs. Since months of industrial training
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Table 5.5
Estimated Impacts of Establishment Size and CMITP Assistance on
Length of Company Training Programs
Explanatory
Specific
General
variable
All programs
training
training
0.0221*
0.0246*
Establishment size
-0.0047
CMITP assistance
2.482*
3.038*
-0.164
Source: Simpson (1984: Table 2).
Notes: Estimates shown are Tobit slope estimates calculated using Tobit regression coeffi
cients and evaluating the explanatory variables at their means, ^signifies that the underlying
Tobit regression coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.

can be zero or positive but not negative, Simpson uses the Tobit
regression technique to obtain unbiased parameter estimates for an
extensive list of explanatory variables. As the Tobit model is nonlin
ear, slope estimates analogous to ordinary least squares coefficient
estimates are calculated using the Tobit parameter estimates and
evaluating all the explanatory variables at their means.
Looking at the first column of table 5.5, the significantly positive
slope estimate for establishment size reinforces the conclusion that
larger employers are more likely to provide training services. Hold
ing constant the effect of size, acceptance of the CMITP wagesubsidy increases length of training programs by about two and onehalf months on average. Unfortunately, Simpson's results do not
differentiate between programs directed at unemployed workers and
those intended to upgrade the skills of existing employees.
The second and third columns of table 5.5 attempt to pin down the
nature of the training provided. Distinguishing specific from general
training by employers' answers to a question asking whether vacan
cies in a particular occupation might be filled by hiring outside per
sonnel with the required skills, firm size is seen to be positively
associated with specific but not general training. Similarly, receijpt
of government assistance increases specific training by three months
on average, but it has no appreciable effect on general training. The
latter result is anticipated since human capital theory suggests that
general training, since it is transferable between employers, will be
fully paid for by trainees in the form of reduced wages. Thus, sub
sidies to employers are expected to be effective only in cases where
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workers are unable to finance general training investments because
of wage floors. On the other hand, the theory predicts that employ
ers will share in the cost of specific training, so that a wage-subsidy
program can potentially make a difference in available training op
portunities.

The YTO Evaluation
One other, more recent, Canadian evaluation study that should be
briefly mentioned is the EIC (1987) analysis of the Youth Training
Option (YTO) of the Job Entry program. As noted in table 5.1, Job
Entry is the component of the CJS designed to assist noncollegebound youth in making the transition from school to work. The EIC
evaluation examines the YTO program as it existed during its pilot
project phase, which lasted from September 1984 to December 1985.
During this period, a total of 4,320 individuals began training in
YTO projects. Trainees were about equally divided by sex and about
85 percent were between the ages of 18 and 21. Nearly 90 percent of
trainees were unemployed immediately prior to program entry.
For the purpose of this monograph, the most noteworthy feature of
the YTO is its goal of involving private-sector employers in actual
program delivery. YTO supplied a combined program of formal
classroom training coupled with on-the-job training furnished in an
operating business termed a "training place host." The focal point
of the program was the "managing coordinator" who, under con
tract to the EIC, was responsible for developing and implementing
proposals, arranging the off-site CT programs, and securing training
place hosts to provide OJT. In addition, the managing coordinator
was in charge of recruiting, selecting, and placing trainees and mon
itoring their progress through the program. Managing coordinators
could be private businesses or business-oriented groups such as
Chambers of Commerce, government departments or agencies,
school boards or schools, and community-oriented nonprofit organi
zations.
In an effort to isolate the effect of the private-sector involvement
in the program, the EIC's evaluation strategy compares the labor
market performance of YTO trainees with that of a comparison
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group of NITP participants. As described earlier in this chapter,
NITP featured very little employer participation since it was de
signed to supply classroom training through Canada's existing edu
cational infrastructure. Using samples of about 2,500 YTO trainees
and about 2,000 NITP trainees, the average employment rate for
YTO trainees is found to rise from 33.1 percent in the 12-month
pre-training period to 69.8 percent in the 4-month post-training pe
riod. This 36.7 percentage point increase dwarfs the 7.7 percent
point increase measured over the same period for NITP participants.
Making use of a regression framework to control for other measured
characteristics of trainees, YTO participants are found to have expe
rienced post-program employment rates 16 percentage points higher
than NITP trainees.
Summary
This chapter began by providing an overview of the broad range of
services offered displaced workers through the Canadian Jobs Strat
egy. These services, like the state programs discussed in chapter 4,
are available to employed workers at risk of layoff as well as to
already unemployed workers. In addition to standard CT and OJT
services directed to workers and employers, the Community Futures
program of the CIS also provides a variety of forms of assistance to
small communities hard hit by a plant closure or mass layoff.
The remainder of the chapter focused on the available evaluations
of two major Canadian displaced worker programs. Regarding the
labor market effectiveness of classroom and on-the-job training,
these evaluations generally support the conclusions reached in chap
ter 3 for the U.S. demonstration projects. Evidence for the NITP's
Skill Training component using a comparison group of nonparticipants indicates that CT does not have a statistically significant im
pact on either weekly wages or annual earnings. Similarly, the pre
program/post-program comparison available for evaluating the
CMITP fails to indicate for any of the three categories of workers
considered (employed, unemployed, or special needs) that comple
tion of an OJT program increased wages above the wage gains en
joyed by program dropouts.
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A unique feature of the NITP among the programs examined in
this monograph is that it provided remedial education as well as skill
training. Unfortunately, the effort to upgrade basic mathematics and
communications skills in the BTSD component of the program is
found to significantly decrease both earnings and employment oppor
tunities. This result must, however, be interpreted with more than
usual caution for at least two reasons. First, remedial education was
not necessarily intended to prepare workers for immediate employ
ment. Second, the appropriateness of the comparison group of nonparticipants may be questioned since, in addition to being very
small, it appears to contain relatively few individuals with character
istics like those of trainees.
An employer survey included as part of the CMITP evaluation
also provides evidence supporting some of the conclusions reached
in chapter 4. The internal EIC evaluation of these survey data rein
forces a finding for Minnesota's MEED program indicating that
small employers have a substantially greater propensity than larger
employers to participate in retraining initiatives directed at unem
ployed workers. On the other hand, large Canadian employers, like
the large California employers in the ETP program, are dispropor
tionately likely to participate in programs intended to upgrade the
skills of existing employees. The CMITP employer survey data also
suggest that among participating employers, it is small firms that are
most likely to respond to a wage-subsidy program by generating a
net increase in the delivery of training services. Although it is a
training initiative directed at noncollege-bound youth rather than dis
placed workers, finally, the evaluation of the YTO program provides
some evidence that the involvement of private-sector employers in a
combined CT-OJT program can make a substantial difference in the
post-program employability of participants.
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NOTES
1. Later in the chapter, the Job Entry program is also discussed in connection with the eval
uation of the Youth Training Option, which is a component program within Job Entry.
2. The available evidence on the effectiveness of programs in Britain and France and of a pilot
project in Ohio that provide income-maintenance allowances and entrepreneurship training to
unemployed workers who establish small businesses is examined in Leigh (1989: 126-31).
3. Under the Canadian Jobs Strategy established in 1985, BTSD is only provided as a prereq
uisite for skill training programs.
4. About 84 percent of participating employers provided training by asking trainees to do the
same work as other workers or to work as helpers in teams of experienced workers.

6
Australian Training Programs

The Australian federal government has funded programs aimed
specifically at assisting workers displaced by structural change since
the early 1970s. The first of these programs was the Structural Adjust
ment Assistance (SAA) program begun in 1973 and terminated in 1976.
SAA was followed by the Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements
(LATA) created in 1982. Finally, the Heavy Engineering Labour Ad
justment Assistance program was introduced in 1986. This chapter
begins with an overview of these displaced worker programs, includ
ing a discussion of parallels between the SAA program and the U.S.
Trade Adjustment Assistance program. Then the results of a 1986
evaluation of the LATA program are examined (see Ho-Trieu 1986).

Basic Elements of the Programs
The SAA Program
Table 6.1 summarizes the three Australian displaced worker pro
grams in terms of targeted workers and the adjustment assistance
services offered. During its three-year existence, the SAA program
provided income-maintenance allowances to workers and proprietors
of small businesses made jobless by structural changes resulting
from particular federal government policy decisions. These policy
decisions included a 25 percent cut in tariffs carried out in July 1973
and changes in a number of industry-specific assistance measures.
Workers directly affected by these actions became eligible under
SAA for six months of income-maintenance payments, with the size
of the payment set equal to the individual's average wage over the
previous six months subject to a cap of 1.5 times the average weekly
earnings of all Australian workers.
As a policy response to trade liberalization and in its emphasis
on income maintenance rather than retraining, the short history
91
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Table 6.1
Australian Programs to Assist Displaced Workers
Program
Targeted workers
Program services
Trade-displaced
Income-maintenance
SAA (1973-76)
workers
allowances
LATA (1982-present)

Workers displaced
from designated indus
tries including steel,
coal, and autos

Payment to schools for
the direct costs of CT
plus incomemaintenance allow
ances paid to trainees

Heavy Engineering
Labor Adjustment As
sistance (1986present)

Workers displaced in
the heavy engineering
industry

(1) Payment to schools
for the direct costs of
CT plus incomemaintenance allow
ances paid to trainees
(2) Financial assis
tance to employers to
develop formal train
ing programs
(3) Wage-subsidy pay
ments to employers to
encourage OJT
(4) Relocation assis
tance to workers

of the SAA program offers striking parallels to the much longer
lived Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program originally enacted
by the U.S. Congress in 1962. TAA assistance included incomemaintenance support above that provided by UI, and targeted work
ers were those displaced from jobs in industries adversely affected by
increased foreign competition arising from the relaxation of import
restrictions. To counteract the expected effect of income maintenance
in lengthening unemployment spells, TAA provided job search assis
tance and relocation allowances to eligible displaced workers. Skill
retraining was also available to assist in the replacement of specific
human capital made obsolete by trade-related displacement.
For the first 12 years of TAA, a very low rate of participation
reflected the program's stringent requirement that affected workers
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and firms demonstrate that trade liberalization led to increased im
ports which, in turn, were the "major" cause of reduced domestic
sales and lost jobs. The Trade Act of 1974 relaxed TAA requirements
making eligibility easier and providing an even more generous in
come support package over a longer time period. The combination
of easier eligibility and improved benefits caused TAA expenditures
and the number of workers served to increase rapidly over the next
several years, peaking at more than $2.2 billion and over 500,000
workers in 1980. Nevertheless, very few TAA recipients received
any reemployment services. Bednarzik and Orr (1984) cite a General
Accounting Office study indicating that over the 1975-78 period,
less than 1 percent of program participants received ISA and reloca
tion services and less than 4 percent received skill training.
Returning to Australia's SSA, a program review was conducted in
1975 at the request of the Prime Minister, which resulted in the rec
ommendation that SSA be discontinued. The review panel's negative
recommendation was based on the following overlapping arguments
(Bureau of Labour Market Research 1987: 194):
1. The special benefits to designated displaced workers reduce the
mobility of those affected by structural change, thus decreasing the
efficiency of the labor market.
2. Pressures on the government to extend benefits to other unem
ployed workers are difficult to resist.
3. Those unemployed for reasons other than the particular policy
decisions or through the indirect effects of these decisions are not
eligible for program assistance.
4. The determination of whether particular workers are unem
ployed as a result of the government's specific policy decisions is
difficult and arbitrary.
For many of the same reasons, the available evaluations of TAA
conclude with generally negative appraisals of the program. Neu
mann (1978) reports that the higher income-maintenance benefits re
ceived by trade displaced workers tended to increase unemployment
duration and (for men only) post-unemployment earnings, and that
training and counseling services had little effect on reemployment.
Examining the post-1974 operation of TAA, Corson and Nicholson
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(1981) similarly conclude that the higher wage-replacement ratio
lengthened unemployment spells. But they find no appreciable effect
on post-unemployment earnings. Probably the strongest result pre
sented by Corson and Nicholson is that the liberalization of eligibil
ity conditions in 1974 caused a dramatic shift in the composition of
TAA recipients. Rather than primarily benefiting workers formerly
employed in older declining industries who could not reasonably ex
pect to be recalled to their old jobs, nearly 72 percent of TAA re
cipients ended their unemployment spells by returning to work for
their previous employer. A reasonably high expectation of being able
to return to one's old job is surely an important factor in explaining
the very small percentages of recipients who made use of available
reemployment services.
Congressional concern over TAA's high cost and the special treat
ment of program recipients whose labor market circumstances did
not appear to be that different from those of regular UI recipients led
to new legislation in 1981 that tightened eligibility and reduced in
come support payments. Authorization for TAA lapsed in 1985, but
legislation passed in 1986 extended a much scaled-back version of
the program for five more years. The 1986 legislation included a
requirement that receipt of income support is conditional on partici
pation in a job search program, and that workers are to be encour
aged, but not required, to engage in skill training. Most recently, the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended both the
Trade Act of 1974 as it affected TAA and Title III of JTPA. (As
mentioned in chapter 1, the amendment to JTPA Title III is known
as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act
or EDWAA.) The 1988 TAA amendment continues the requirement
that income-maintenance support is conditional on participation in
an approved training program.
The LATA Program
Despite the arguments in the 1975 review resulting in the Austra
lian government's decision to terminate SAA, the LATA initiative
created in 1982 is also a categorical program which was initially
directed at workers displaced from jobs in the steel industry. Since
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1982, the program has been expanded to cover the coal mining in
dustry in New South Wales, auto and auto parts manufacturers, and
an International Harvester facility in Victoria. Workers displaced
from their jobs in these industries are targeted for special assistance
on the assumption that their displacement is especially likely to be
the outcome of mass layoffs and plant closings. Large layoffs and
plant closings present communities with the especially difficult prob
lem of absorbing a large number of workers with similar skills who
are all dumped on the local labor market at once.
The primary objective of the LATA program is to develop flexible
training packages to meet the retraining needs of displaced workers,
and there is no restriction placed on the course of study selected by
trainees provided it is vocationally oriented. Training is provided in
government or private educational institutions. In addition to cover
ing the direct costs of classroom training, the LATA program sup
plies an income-maintenance allowance to trainees equal to what an
individual would otherwise have received in UI benefits plus a sup
plementary adult training payment. Assistance is also provided to
meet the costs of textbooks, equipment, and special course fees.

Heavy Engineering Labour Adjustment Assistance
This program is the labor market component of a broadly defined
assistance package developed for the "heavy engineering" industry
(i.e., the capital goods industry) by the Australian government. The
other components include programs designed to assist industry em
ployers in the areas of management efficiency, industrial develop
ment, and new product marketing.
As indicated in table 6.1, the labor market component of the heavy
engineering industry assistance package includes four elements. Simi
lar to the LATA program, the first funds formal training for up to 12
months for workers displaced from designated employers. In contrast
to LATA, however, stronger emphasis is placed on the labor market
relevance of the training curriculum selected. Eligible displaced
workers also qualify for income-maintenance support.
The other three elements of the labor market program broaden
substantially the scope of the services provided. The first of these
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appears to closely parallel the underlying philosophy of California's
Employment Training Panel. That is, financial assistance is offered
to encourage program-eligible employers to avoid layoffs by upgrad
ing the skills of current employees through the establishment of for
mal training programs. Second, to encourage on-the-job training,
displaced workers are made eligible for an employer wage-subsidy
for up to six months. Finally, displaced workers who are unable to
find suitable employment in their local labor markets, but who have
firm job offers elsewhere, are eligible for relocation assistance.
The 1986 LATA Evaluation Study
As part of the LATA evaluation project carried out by the Austra
lian Bureau of Labour Market Research, two surveys were adminis
tered to workers displaced from the General Motors-Holden (GMH)
Acacia Ridge plant located in Brisbane. The first survey was con
ducted one month before the plant closed in October 1984, and the
second was carried out eight months after the closure. A total of 445
GMH workers responded to both surveys. In many respects, these
respondents closely resemble the auto workers surveyed in the
Downriver project discussed in chapter 3. That is, the GMH workers
are almost all males working in production jobs with families to sup
port and considerable work experience. Average age and length of
tenure for respondents are 42 years and 12 years, respectively.
LATA training courses available to GMH workers differed by type
and length, and program participants were eligible to take as many
different courses as they desired. Participants spent an average of 19
weeks on training. The main distinction between the types of courses
taken is whether or not the course had to do with driver training
(i.e., bus, train, or truck driving; forklift driving; operation of earth
moving equipment; and light vehicle driving). During the 8- to 9month observation period available for analysis, 31 percent of re
spondents chose to participate in one or more LATA training
courses. About 54 percent of the courses involved driver training.
The evaluation report by Ho-Trieu (1986) indicates that the probabil
ity of LATA participation peaks for workers in their mid-thirties. In
addition, individuals with spouses in paid work and those who pre-
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viously held supervisory or managerial positions are less likely to
participate than other comparable workers.
The only labor market outcome variable examined by Ho-Trieu is
job placement measured as full-time or part-time employment at the
time of the follow-up interview. Net impact estimates are obtained
by comparing the placement success of former GMH workers who
chose to participate in LATA with the placement of those who chose
not to participate. An obvious problem with this methodology is selfselection in the determination of program participation. A second
problem is that the short length of the observation period implies
that the net impact of longer training courses will be downwardly
biased because of the reduced time available for job search. This
source of bias was considered earlier in chapter 3 in the discussion
of skill training in the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration
projects. There the length of the observation period was 12 months.
With these caveats in mind, and recognizing also that the underly
ing parameter estimates have large standard errors, table 6.2 presents
net impact estimates of LATA training holding constant the effects of
age, marital status, number of children, and job search technique
used (i.e., family, friends, and employment agencies; trade unions;
newspapers; the Australian employment service; and direct employer
contract). The partial probability estimates shown are calculated
from the results of a logistic regression equation, and the estimates
are interpreted as measuring changes in the probability that a typical
former GMH worker will be reemployed by the end of the observa
tion period. In the first column, consequently, a worker who took a
training course of one to four weeks would have a placement proba
bility 9 percentage points less than what his placement probability
would have been had he opted not to undergo training. But if the
short training course involves driver training, the net effect of LATA
would be to increase the probability of reemployment by four per
centage points (= 9% + 13%). The large negative estimate for
courses longer than eight weeks is quite likely the result of the neg
ative bias associated with a reduction in available job search time.
On the argument that it is not possible to accurately assess the
impact of longer training courses, the second column of table 6.2
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Table 6.2
Net Impact Estimates of LATA Training on the Probability
____________________of Reemployment_________________________
Excluding participants
Training variables_____All participants___with longer training
Length of training:
1
-9
1-4 weeks

o
J
6
5-8 weeks
-33
Longer than 8 weeks
9
13
Driver training
Other training_________________ ____________ 7________
Source: Ho-Trieu (1986: tables 6.4 and 6.5).
Note: Other explanatory variables include age, marital status, number of children, and job
search technique. In the second column, participants with total training of more than eight
weeks are excluded from the regression, and training of eight weeks or less is treated as a
indicates that the variable is excluded from the regression.
continuous variable.

reports probability estimates excluding LATA participants who took
training courses exceeding eight weeks in total length. These results
serve to emphasize the much larger impact of courses involving
driver training relative to other LATA courses. Ho-Trieu (1986: 71
72) speculates that possible reasons for the strong impact of driver
training include (1) a closer trainer-trainee relationship in driving
courses, (2) the fact that driving skills can be learned independently
of other factors such as English proficiency and basic academic
skills, and (3) the greater opportunity offered those with driving
qualifications for starting their own contracting businesses.

Summary
Described in this chapter are three programs funded by the Aus
tralian federal government to supply adjustment assistance services
to displaced workers. The SAA program in effect from 1973 to 1976
is similar to the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program in re
stricting program services to trade-displaced workers and in provid
ing eligible workers with income-maintenance allowances. The other
two programs LATA and the Heavy Engineering Labour Adjust
ment Assistance program provide income maintenance and skill
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training to workers displaced from a few selected industries. Both of
these programs are still in operation.
Among the three Australian programs, only LATA has been sub
jected to program evaluation; and this evaluation is limited to a
participant-nonparticipant comparison with the associated selection
bias problem. The evaluation results reported indicate that the type
of training provided (i.e., driver training) makes a substantial differ
ence in the net impact analysis. In this respect, the LATA results
reinforce a conclusion reached in chapter 3 for the Texas WAD
projects. This conclusion is simply that training curriculums offered
must match the interests and backgrounds of targeted workers to
be effective.

7
Conclusion

This study examined evaluation evidence for nine different demon
stration projects and operating programs on the labor market effec
tiveness of public retraining programs for displaced workers. Within
the United States, quantitative results were presented in chapter 3 for
four major, federally funded demonstration projects carried out during
the 1980s. In chronological order, these are the Downriver program,
the Buffalo program of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project,
the Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration, and the New Jersey UI
Reemployment Demonstration. Although all four of the demonstra
tions have the common objective of evaluating alternative reemployment services including job search assistance, classroom training, and
on-the-job training, they differ considerably in terms of geographic lo
cation, sample size, experimental design, and the target populations
of displaced workers served. Turning from federal to state programs,
examined in chapter 4 was the quantitative and qualitative evidence
available for ongoing programs in California and Minnesota. Califor
nia's Employment Training Panel funds skill training programs tailored
to meet the needs of specific employers, while the Minnesota Em
ployment and Economic Development program is a targeted wagesubsidy initiative designed to assist the growth of small businesses.
Beyond the borders of the U.S., evaluation evidence was discussed
in chapters 5 and 6 for two Canadian programs and for an Australian
program. The Canadian National Institutional Training Program pro
vided displaced workers with classroom training, and the earlier Ca
nadian Manpower Industrial Training Program program funded on-thejob training. The NITP is particularly noteworthy in that it supplied
displaced workers with remedial education as well as skill training. Still
in effect, Australia's Labour Adjustment Training Arrangements pro
gram targets CT services and income-maintenance allowances to work
ers displaced from selected industries including steel and coal mining.
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Supplementing the evaluation evidence for these nine programs
are net impact estimates obtained for three additional government
programs not specifically designed to assist displaced workers. Con
sidered in chapter 2 were the evaluations carried out for programs
funded by CETA. In operation between 1973 and 1982, the broadbased CETA program went beyond assistance to displaced workers
to include reemployment services and public-sector job creation di
rected toward disadvantaged workers and the cyclically unemployed.
Included in the discussion of Minnesota's MEED program in chapter
4 were quantitative results from an evaluation study carried out for
the Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment. Finally, evaluation
evidence for the Canadian Youth Training Option was briefly consid
ered in chapter 5 in connection with the CMITP program.
In this concluding chapter, I attempt to make sense of the net im
pact estimates and other evidence obtained for these projects and
programs by first asking what these results have to say regarding the
four policy questions posed in chapter 1. Then some suggestions are
made regarding areas for further research.
Major Policy Questions
Question 1: Do some types of training work better than others?
Beginning with the evidence provided by the U.S. displaced
worker demonstrations, the Buffalo, Texas WAD, and New Jersey
projects indicate unambiguously that job search assistance strongly
affects in the intended direction a variety of labor market outcomes,
including earnings, placement and employment rates, and level of UI
benefits. ISA allows for quick intervention before workers disperse
after layoffs and plant closings; and, given its low cost per worker,
the evidence suggests also that ISA services are cost effective. In
view of the practical difficulties addressed in the New Jersey Dem
onstration of distinguishing early in the post-layoff period displaced
workers from other unemployed workers, JSA's low cost offers the
additional advantage of making it feasible to supply assistance even
to those unemployed workers who turn out ex post to have little dif
ficulty in locating new jobs or are recalled to their old jobs.
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For the other major reemployment services, evidence gathered for
all four U.S. demonstration projects indicates that classroom training
fails to have a sizable incremental effect on earnings and employ
ment above that of ISA-only. In particular, it certainly does not ap
pear that the additional effect of classroom training is large enough
to offset the higher cost of these services. The authors of the evalu
ation reports are plainly troubled by these unexpectedly weak results
for CT, and they offer a number of qualifications to their findings. To
anticipate the discussion of Question 4, these caveats include the fol
lowing: (1) small sample sizes; (2) the problem that participants un
dergoing skill training have relatively little time left to receive
placement assistance (given demonstration periods of fixed length);
(3) the difficulty of finding training providers capable of putting to
gether high-quality, short-duration training courses on short notice;
and (4) the possibility that the classroom training provided is either
not saleable in the local labor market or not of particular interest to
targeted workers. Results obtained for the Australian LATA program
reinforce the second caveat that net impact estimates for longer skill
training programs may be downwardly biased due to the reduced
length of time available for job search.
Regarding on-the-job training, it is interesting to note that the Sec
retary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker
Dislocation (1986: 33-34) recommends that OJT rather than class
room training be regarded as the primary source of long-term skill
upgrading for displaced workers. The CETA evaluations summarized
in chapter 2 support this recommendation by showing generally larger
net impact estimates for OJT than for CT. Among the four demon
stration programs, the Buffalo project is the only one with enough
participants placed in OJT slots to provide reasonably reliable esti
mates of the net impact of on-the-job training. Contrary to the CETA
results, OJT fails to have a consistently positive effect on earnings.
Nor does it have much of an impact on employment rates. Since OJT
was primarily used in the Buffalo program as a placement tool, it
appears that this service was of little value for program participants.
Although the evaluations of national Canadian and Australian re
training programs are not as methodologically rigorous, their findings
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regarding CT and OJT services support the generally negative find
ings yielded by the U.S. demonstrations. Using an externally selected
comparison sample, skill training provided in a classroom setting is
found in the Canadian NITP program not to significantly affect either
weekly wages or annual earnings. In addition, the participant-nonparticipant comparison available for the Australian LATA program
suggests that classroom training actually reduces the probability of reemployment during the observation period (although there is evidence
that the training curriculum makes a difference). Similarly, the pre
program/post-program comparison available for program completers
and dropouts for Canada's CMITP indicates that OJT had little im
pact on weekly wages. Given the present state of our knowledge, it
seems reasonable to conclude, along with Bloom and Kulik (1986:
181), that skill training should be offered sparingly for well-specified
needs and only where adequate local training resources are present.
Beyond the three major retraining services, the Basic Training for
Skill Development (BTSD) component of the Canadian NITP is the
only program discussed in this monograph that permits an examination
of the labor market effectiveness of remedial education. Unfortu
nately, Canada's effort to upgrade basic mathematics and communi
cations skills is found to significantly decrease both earnings and
employment opportunities. There are at least two reasons, however,
to expect these estimates to be downwardly biased. One is that BTSD
training was not necessarily intended to prepare workers for imme
diate employment. The second reason is that the BTSD comparison
group appears to be inappropriate since, in addition to being very
small, it contains relatively few individuals with characteristics like
those of trainees.
Question 2: Do some groups of workers benefit more from
training than others?
The Texas WAD projects probably provide the best evidence of all
of the demonstration projects and programs examined regarding dif
ferential program effects across workers classified by gender and
race or ethnicity. In terms of earnings and employment, female par
ticipants in the El Paso WAD project are found to enjoy much larger
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net impact estimates than males in both the El Paso and Houston
projects. More specifically, female participants in El Paso experi
enced a program-induced gain in annual earnings of $1,070 during
the 1983-85 period; while the gains in annual earnings for men in
Houston and El Paso were only $750 and $770, respectively. This
difference between program sites is even more impressive when it is
recognized that a majority of male Houston participants are white,
whereas female El Paso participants are largely Hispanic.
Reinforcing the gender difference in the WAD results is evidence
from the CETA evaluations and the Buffalo project indicating larger
program effects for women than men. The Buffalo project also sug
gests that little difference in net impact estimates exists for blacks
and whites, but that workers under age 45 benefit more from pro
gram services than do older workers.
Rather than race/ethnicity and sex differences, the results of the
New Jersey Demonstration disaggregated by population subgroups
emphasize the distinction between workers with marketable skills
and workers facing long-term, structural reemployment problems.
Clerical and other white-collar workers are examples of the former
group, while blue-collar workers laid off from durable goods manu
facturing jobs typify the latter. The evaluation report by Corson et
al. (1989) indicates that program services were primarily of assis
tance to workers with marketable skills, a finding that is consistent
with the New Jersey Demonstration's objective of encouraging rapid
reemployment. As mentioned in chapter 1, however, a case can be
made that it is the sizable minority of displaced workers who are at
risk of lengthy spells of joblessness to whom adjustment assistance
should be targeted. These individuals are likely to require longerrun, more intensive services.

Question 3: To the extent that training improves reemployment
prospects, does it work by increasing post-training wage rates
or by reducing the duration of unemployment?
For all program services combined, the Buffalo project permits the
calculation of short-run program effects on weekly hours and aver
age weekly earnings. The larger percentage effect on average weekly
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earnings than weekly hours suggests that the Buffalo program
boosted hourly wages for those reemployed during the first six postprogram months. Buttressing this finding, an analysis of state admin
istrative data indicates for the New Jersey Demonstration that each
of the three program treatments (i.e., ISA-only, ISA plus retraining,
and ISA plus a reemployment bonus) had a small positive impact on
the wages of reemployed workers.
In contrast, the more detailed quarter-by-quarter program impact
estimates calculated for the Texas WAD projects and the New Jersey
Demonstration indicate that this short-run positive effect on wage
rates does not persist over time. For both men and women, the time
pattern of the WAD results shows that the program increased quar
terly earnings in the first and second quarters, followed by gradually
decaying impacts for subsequent quarters. Similar results broken
down by program treatment are obtained using follow-up interview
data on employment and earnings in the New Jersey project. Thus,
while the reemployment process was speeded up by program services
in both demonstrations, participants' employment opportunities ap
pear ultimately to be no better and their wages no higher than those
of the members of the control group. There is little convincing evi
dence, in other words, that program services in either the Texas
WAD or the New Jersey Demonstration increased labor productivity.
The evaluation of on-the-job training in the Canadian CMITP also
suggests, as noted, that program completion had little impact in
terms of wage gains.

Question 4: Referring specifically to vocational training, how do
we know what to train workers to do?
An important contribution of the displaced worker demonstration
projects is to make apparent the difficulty in a short-duration dem
onstration of designing solid training curricula that meet the market
test of providing saleable skills. Of the four U.S. demonstrations,
Downriver program planners probably paid the most attention to the
problem of providing retraining in occupations expected to be in high
demand. Yet, as described in chapter 3 and noted earlier, skill training
is not found to have significantly improved Downriver participants'
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reemployment prospects above the assistance provided by ISA. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984: 16) note for all six sites of the
Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project that key lessons learned are
that (1) many displaced workers will not be able to adapt to class
room training, and (2) despite attempts to base course selection on
labor market data, many successful program graduates may not be
able to locate training-related jobs. These authors go on to recom
mend the use of performance-based contracting with training vendors
as one way to improve participant screening in determining access to
CT programs and to increase post-program placement and job reten
tion rates. The WAD demonstration also emphasizes that one reason
for low program take-up rates and modest net impact estimates is
that CT curricula may not match the backgrounds and perceived
needs of client workers. Evaluation results obtained for the Austra
lian LATA program underscore the point that the type of training
provided can make a substantial difference in net impact estimates.
State-funded retraining programs are typically more tailored to
meet the needs of individual employers than federal programs, and
chapter 4 focused attention on employer involvement in California's
ETP and the program's stringent performance standards. California
employers are encouraged to propose individual retraining projects
for ETP funding. If a project is approved and a contract negotiated,
the employer selects trainees according to its own specification, sets
standards for successful program completion, and approves the train
ing curriculum if an outside training provider is used. ETP's perfor
mance standards permit training providers to be reimbursed for
training expenses only for those trainees who successfully complete
the program and are placed in training-related jobs at stipulated
wages and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
Allowing employers to participate in trainee selection and the use
of performance-based contracting clearly should contribute to strong
program performance in terms of job placement, and preliminary
empirical results obtained for ETP indicate a sizable program effect
on annual earnings. Although it is a training initiative directed at
noncollege-bound youth rather than displaced workers, the evalua
tion of the Canadian YTO program provides additional evidence that
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the involvement of private-sector employers in a combined CT-OJT
program can make a substantial difference in the post-program employability of participants. Nevertheless, the ETP approach has been
subjected to a number of criticisms. One of these is that program
performance standards increase the likelihood that training providers
will select those eligible workers least in need of retraining. A sec
ond criticism centers on the strong incentive given employers to
retrain current employees, as opposed to offering training to unem
ployed workers. A consequence of the observed increase over time in
the retraining of the employed is that ETP may be substituting public
funds for the training investments employers would have made them
selves in the program's absence.
In the context of these criticisms, an important outcome of Min
nesota's MEED wage-subsidy program is its demonstration that it is
possible to target assistance to the hard-to-employ and still enjoy
widespread business support, particularly the support of small busi
nessmen. That is, Minnesota program officials appear to have suc
cessfully overcome the stigma associated by employers with program
vouchers in the Dayton targeted wage-subsidy experiment. The inter
nal evaluation of Canada's CMITP program reinforces the MEED
evidence in indicating that small employers have a substantially
greater propensity than larger employers to participate in retraining
initiatives directed at unemployed workers. On the other hand, large
Canadian employers, like large California employers, are dispropor
tionately likely to participate in programs intended to upgrade the
skills of existing employees. The CMITP employer survey data also
suggest that among participating employers, it is small firms that are
most likely to respond to a wage-subsidy program by generating a
net increase in the delivery of training services.

Agenda for Future Research
The recommendation that emerges most strongly from the empir
ical evidence analyzed in this monograph is that ISA should be the
core service on the menu of adjustment assistance services offered
displaced workers. With respect to other services, however, the evi
dence is not as conclusive; and there appear to be several topics on
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which future research is needed. Important items on the agenda for
future research include the following.
1. It is reasonable to conclude that, if offered at all, skill training
provided in a classroom setting should be limited to carefully
screened trainees whose specific needs can be adequately matched
with local training resources. But even in this highly controlled situ
ation, as noted by Bloom and Kulik (1986: 182), whether a high
quality, targeted skill training program can be cost effective is an
open question and should be the subject of further research.
2. A closely related issue is the recommendation of the Secretary
of Labor's Task Force (1986: 34) that classroom training be matched
to the needs of identified employers and that contracts with training
providers be performance-based. A clear benefit of placing these con
straints on the design of CT programs is the associated increase in job
placement. Nevertheless, this benefit needs to be carefully weighed
against the potential costs of creaming in the trainee selection pro
cess and of providing a windfall to employers who would have oth
erwise supplied retraining at their own expense. Further research,
perhaps building on the experience of California's ETP, on how to
design CT programs to minimize these costs would be helpful.
3. The Secretary of Labor's Task Force (1986: 34) also strongly
recommends that OJT, as opposed to CT, be the preferred method of
long-term skill training. Yet, the limited empirical evidence reviewed
here suggests, at best, a lukewarm assessment of the effectiveness of
on-the-job training. A key issue in the design of OJT programs
involves the incentives necessary to stimulate employer interest in
providing retraining opportunities; and further examination of pro
grams, like Minnesota's MEED, which appear to be well received by
employers, would be of value.
4. Many studies of the reemployment assistance needs of displaced
workers include a recommendation that strengthening basic skills is
essential to allow workers to cope with rapid technological change
and increased international competitiveness (see, for example, Cyert
and Mowery 1987: 185-86 and the Secretary of Labor's Task Force
1986: 33-34). Despite the suggestion in the Corson et al. (1989)
evaluation of the New Jersey Demonstration that remedial education
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may be needed for displaced workers who face long-term, structural
reemployment problems, only the Canadian NITP of the programs
examined here furnishes quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of
this program service. The negative results of the Robinson et al.
(1985) evaluation of NITP's remedial education component must be
interpreted recognizing the caveats noted earlier in this chapter. An
important topic for further research is identification of the proper
objective function for remedial training programs, followed by addi
tional evaluation evidence on the determinants of success and failure
of these programs.
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